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Randomization and the Fourth Amendment
Bernard E. Harcourtt& Tracey L. Mearestt
Randomized checkpoint searches are generally taken to be the exact antithesisof
reasonablenessunder the FourthAmendment. In the eyes of most jurists checkpoint
searches violate the central requirementof valid Fourth Amendment searches-namely,
individualized suspicion. We disagree. In this Article, we contend that randomized
searches should serve as the very lodestar of a reasonable search. The notion of
"individualized"suspicion is misleading;most suspicion in the modem policing context
is group based and not individual specific. Randomized searches by definition are
accompanied by a certain level of suspicion. The constitutional issue, we maintain,
should not turn on the question of suspicion-basedversus suspicionlesspolice searches,
but on the level of suspicion that attaches to any search program and on the
evenhandedness of the program. In essence, we argue for a new paradigm of
randomized encounters that satisfy a base level of suspicion and that will provide the
benefits of both privacy protection (by ensuring a minimum level of suspicion) and
evenhandedness (by cabining police discretion), the very values we wish to protect
through the FourthAmendment.
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INTRODUCTION

In the eyes of most jurists, checkpoint searches symbolize the
exact antitheses of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. No matter
whether the checkpoints operate on a randomized or exhaustive basis,
or whether they entail immediate searches or discretionary referrals
to a secondary site, courts and commentators typically use the
checkpoint to illustrate police searches that do not satisfy a central
requirement of the Fourth Amendment-individualized suspicion.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor sums up the standard view: "For most
of our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless searches have been
generally considered per se unreasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment."' Naturally, there are exceptions in cases of
exigent circumstances -an emergency road block designed to catch a
fleeing felon is one notable example-but under ordinary
circumstances, checkpoints are almost universally condemned for
violating the central tenet of individualized suspicion that lies at the
heart of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
The problem with this conventional account is that it conflates
the suspicionlessnature of the checkpoint search with the randomized
aspect of the search. The two ingredients-lack of suspicion and
randomization- are collapsed in the constitutional analysis, as if
"random" necessarily means "suspicionless." As a result, in the
constitutional debates over random drug testing, border patrol
checkpoints, and administrative inspections, the controversy inevitably
turns on the costs to privacy of having suspicionless searches versus
the benefits of evenhandedness that flow from randomized searches.

1 Vernonia School District471 v Acton, 515 US 646,667 (1995) (O'Connor dissenting). See
also Ybarra v Illinois, 444 US 85,91 (1979).
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The conflation of the two inevitably reinforces a negative view of
checkpoint searches.
We take a different view based on an important conceptual
separation of the issue of suspicion from the question of randomization.
We contend that the model of the randomized checkpoint should serve
as the lodestar for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and
that the concept of "individualized suspicion" should be abandoned.
Randomization is crucial to promoting the value of evenhandedness,
which is necessary to achieve the goal of controlling discretion, a goal
that lies at the very heart of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. We
also argue that randomized searches by definition are accompanied by a
certain level of suspicion. The constitutional issue, we maintain, should
not turn on the question of suspicion-based versus suspicionless police
encounters with individuals, but first on the level of suspicion that
attaches to any search program and second on the evenhandedness of
the program. In essence, we argue for a new paradigm of randomized
encounters that satisfies a base level of suspicion in order to capture the
benefits of both privacy protection (by ensuring a minimum level of
suspicion) and evenhandedness (by cabining police discretion).
We begin by noting that the concept of "individualized suspicion"
is based on a faulty understanding of suspicion, and, as a result, Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has been constructed using an inaccurate
model of suspicion. The model is inaccurate in at least two ways. First,
the term "individualized suspicion" is misleading in that it implies that
the process of suspicion-based judgments is binary: suspicion is either
individualized and constitutional, or it is not. In reality, suspicion is a
probabilistic concept. It is, in technical terms, a continuous variable,
not a categorical one. Second, the term is misleading because it
suggests that law enforcers come to judgments about individuals by
evaluating unique individual traits. In reality, most individuals arouse
suspicion because of the group-based-type behavior that they exhibit
or the fact that they belong to readily identifiable groups-sex and
age are two examples -rather than because of unique individual traits.
Typically, individuals come to police attention because they are young,
or are male, or are running away from the police, or have a bulge in
their pocket.2 To be sure, there are cases when suspicion attaches to an
individual because of his or her unique identification. Arrest warrants
executed for a fugitive of the law are the best example. But these cases
obviously are rare in contrast to the more typical police-civilian
encounter. Let us explain both of these points.
2
For a discussion of the factors that gave rise to suspicion in a study of New York City
policing, see notes 20-25 and accompanying text.

812

The University of Chicago Law Review

[78:809

First, the proper way to think about suspicion is with reference to
a probability scale of 0 to 1, not as either individualized or not.
Consider a case in which a police officer sees a known batterer
assaulting his wife. The level of suspicion regarding the batterer is
high, at, or very close to, 1 on a probability scale. Similarly, when
Roman Polanski is identified at the airport in Switzerland on the basis
of his passport and matched -by full name, date of birth, and place of
birth -to an outstanding arrest warrant, the level of suspicion is again
high, at, or very close to, 1.' Now consider a case in which a police
officer observes an African American man whose measured pacing,
peering, and conferring make the police officer suspicious that he
might be engaged in or preparing to commit a crime. The level of
suspicion the officer has regarding this suspect is lower than in the
first two cases we described.' Note, though, that a court utilizing a
binary "individualized suspicion" standard would find individualized
suspicion in all of these cases. In fact, the Supreme Court found
individualized suspicion on the facts of the third case in Terry v Ohio.'
Note, too, that the binary metric of "individualized suspicion" does not
give courts a way to distinguish among these cases and does not
compel courts to spell out how much suspicion is necessary to trigger
a justifiable stop or arrest. As it is commonly employed, the
"individualized suspicion" standard provides courts only the option of
coding these very different encounters 0 or 1, without realistically
giving any guidance as to the quantum of suspicion necessary to
delineate the binary 1.'

3 We think this point is noncontroversial, but for a different view of suspicion that rejects
the probabilistic concept we espouse here and instead adopts a virtue-oriented approach to
epistemic rationality, see generally Eric J. Miller, The Epistemology of Suspicion (Yale Law
School Working Paper, Apr 2011) (on file with authors).
4
Naturally, someone else who resembles Polanski may have stolen his passport and be
impersonating Polanski, so the level of suspicion is never really 1. But it is very close in that case.
5
We refer here, obviously, to the facts recounted by Detective Martin McFadden to justify
his stop and search of John W. Terry in the famous case of Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 5-8 (1968).
6
392 US 1, 30 (1968).
7
To be sure, the courts could distinguish between more or less suspicion in these cases
and could allow an arrest in the first two, but only a stop-interrogate-and-frisk in the third. The
courts might intervene to weigh the amount of intrusion of the search or seizure against the
amount of evidence of suspicion. But in all these cases, police intervention and coercion is
constitutionally permitted because the constitutional standard of "individualized suspicion"though indeterminate, undefined, and unquantified-has been met. By contrast, if a court were
to utilize a probabilistic spectrum standard in these cases, see Part IB, the court would have to
clearly identify the quantum of suspicion in each case and determine whether that quantum
satisfies constitutional requirements based on a measured comparison between the quantum in
those cases and the level of suspicion necessary to satisfy the constitutional values underlying the
Fourth Amendment. The court would have to code the cases along a continuous scale and would
have to specify what amount of suspicion satisfies the constitutional mandate.
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Second, the most natural way to think about suspicion is in terms
of group-based identifiers. For the most part, suspicion attaches to
group-based traits, conditions, and behaviors; the police identify sets
of individuals with motives, individuals who match a drug-courier
profile, individuals who fit an eye-witness description, individuals who
are in a specific location, or individuals who have the same blood type.
In the Terry case, for instance, Detective Martin McFadden became
suspicious of the suspects because they displayed a number of
behaviors that McFadden, through his years of experience, had come
to equate with criminal behavior: walking back and forth, looping
back to a location, looking around furtively.! In other cases, suspicion
attaches to a group trait that an individual displays, such as having a
bulge in one's pants pocket, fitting a description in the vicinity of a
recently committed offense, throwing away a plastic vial at the sight of
a police patrol car, or driving a car with Florida license plates on the
New Jersey Tmpike. These are group-based determinations often
made irrespective of the officer's knowledge of whether a specific
offense has been committed, and suspicion potentially attaches to all
individuals within these categories. Suspicion in these cases is
"individualized" only in the sense that it attaches to an individual
because he or she is a member of the suspect group. In other words, in
most cases of policing, suspicion does not originate at the individual
level.
By modeling suspicion on a binary standard rather than a
probabilistic one, courts have created a mismatch between Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and everyday police work. As an empirical
matter, only a small fraction of police practice involves retrospective
criminal investigations in which law enforcement officers have
sufficient information to identify one individual-"the one who did
it." Very few cases involve police officers witnessing a known culprit
engaging in crime.' In reality, police practice is dominated by
discretionary decisions about whom to stop and investigate based on
leads and suspicious behaviors that fit within group categoriesprospective and preventative actions that are based on levels of
suspicion short of 1. In the vast majority of cases, what we really want

8

392 US at 5-7.
See Part I.B. To be sure, in those very few cases, there would be good reason to use a
binary standard as the model of suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. Such a binary standard
would fit those exceptional cases comfortably because, in those cases, the binary and the
spectrum essentially coincide. That is, the level of suspicion is practically a 1 on the probability
scale and is certainly a 1 in binary terms. But those are the exceptional cases-and using them as
the loadstar distorts the functioning of the Fourth Amendment.

9

The University of Chicago Law Review

814

[78:809

to know is whether there is enough suspicion (in probability terms) to
conclude that the Constitution has been satisfied.
It is true that if law enforcement officers were authorized to act
only in those rare cases where they are pursuing that "one individual,"
then the binary model would fit police work more comfortably and
would help guide police officers and courts reviewing police officers'
actions. But that is far from the case. As we detail below, the vast
majority of police work is made up of interactions with group-based
traits, and there the binary model courts employ offers no guidance.o
Let us take a moment here to be clear: we do not believe that the
"individualized suspicion" standard is too stringent or that it asks for
too much or too high a degree of suspicion. The problem is not that the
binary model requires that there be practical certainty in all cases that the level of suspicion reach 1. (It should be obvious that it does
not, as evidenced by the fact that Terry stops satisfy individualized
suspicion.) To the contrary, the problem is that the binary model does
not specify in any way what level of suspicion the Constitution
requires, and therefore courts have completely punted the question.
The binary model is essentially unidentified, and so it offers no
guidance to the police to ensure that their decisions comport with the
Constitution. By contrast, we will detail here a model of suspicion that
realistically produces an explicit analysis of the amount of suspicion
needed in any police case.
Another way to say this- a more legally stylized way, perhaps -is
that the "individualized suspicion" standard relies on a "Warrant
Model" of reasonable searches that is entirely out of step with
ordinary policing, which is characterized in truth by a "Patrol Model,"
and that the clash between the two models undermines the
constitutional standard of reasonableness. Drawing metaphorically on
the text of the Fourth Amendment itself, it is possible to think of the
constitutional provision as itself containing two models-a Patrol
Model and a Warrant Model. The text of the amendment contains two

10 See Part I.B.
11 One further clarification: if someone were to respond here that individualized suspicion is

not 1 on the probability scale, but 0.5, and therefore that individualized suspicion is in effect, an
expression of the probability scale that we urge courts to use, then we would emphasize again that,
especially on that understanding, the term "individualized suspicion" is being used in a conclusory
manner-it overlaps completely with "constitutional" or "reasonable" suspicion. It does no
independent work at all. What, then, is the point of using the term "individualized suspicion"? Why
not call it "constitutional" or "reasonable suspicion" tout court? Our point is that it is far better for
the police, for citizens, and for the courts to define the level of suspicion that attaches to any
particular situation and to use this probabilistic approach to suspicion to address the constitutional
question whether there is reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a stop.
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clauses.12 The first clause goes to the larger issue of reasonableness; the
second, to the requirement that warrants issue only on probable cause.
Our contention is that the Court has created the "individualized
suspicion" requirement in the image of the second clause and
embraced a Warrant Model-one in which the police must be able to
describe with particularity the individual or things to be searched or
seized." But in so doing, the Court has created a fictional rubric of
"individualized suspicion" that does more harm than good. Instead of
ensuring a heightened requirement for police encounters, the standard
actually masks the required level of suspicion in most cases. We think
that the Court should instead craft a standard of reasonableness
driven by the Patrol Model of policing, which is the reality on the
street. Such a standard would be tied to the first clause of the Fourth
Amendment and would assess reasonableness in light of the amount
of suspicion underlying a search or seizure and also with reference to
the extent of evenhandedness law enforcers employ when engaging in
searches and seizures."
Nothing we have said so far requires that we advocate for
randomization, of course. We could simply urge that courts use a more
honest metric of suspicion and stop there. We promote the concept of
randomization for two reasons: First, because suspicion predominantly
attaches to groups, at least in the ordinary policing context. When we
require a certain level of suspicion, it turns out, we have identified a
group of individuals-generally, a group that contains individuals of
different races, ethnicities, gender, and so on. In order to pick from
within that group-wherein each member satisfies the required level
of suspicion-we ought to use a neutral sorting mechanism. We must
pick fairly from the group. Once we have decided to search within any
category, we are in effect searching within the group. The only way to
do that without injecting bias and prejudice is to randomly search the
group, because randomization allows us to select from the group while
avoiding illegitimate criteria to discriminate within the group.

See US Const Amend IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
13 See Thomas K. Clancy, The FourthAmendment's Concept of Reasonableness,2004 Utah
L Rev 977,994-98.
14 One other option going forward, naturally, would be to tack more closely to the Warrant
Clause and actually require warrant-like specificity and probable cause for all police-civilian
encounters. That would require reversing Terry, the Court's jurisprudence on articulable
suspicion, and strengthening or defining the level of suspicion required by "probable cause."
12
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Second, and related, randomization allows for perfectly
representative sampling within a group. The only way to obtain a fair
and representative sample within a group that does not skew on other
dimensions is to use a randomization mechanism." Suspicion-sufficient
checkpoints help to ensure that the population touched by policing (the
population with police and correctional contacts) will reflect accurately
the offending population. As we explain in greater detail below,
suspicion-sufficient checkpoints avoid the risk of ratchets and
disproportionality in the arrestee, jail, or prison populations. What the
checkpoint can provide is an updated and accurate profile of the
offending population-a snapshot of offender distributions." And that,
we believe, promotes the values at the heart of the Fourth Amendment
and of due process, values that require the state to treat all similarly
situated individuals -here, offenders- similarly.
In this Article, we argue that the expression "individualized
suspicion" should be abandoned. The term, which was born relatively
recently in the 1960s, has become today a placeholder for the
conclusion that a search or seizure is constitutional. As such, the term
masks the level of suspicion that courts do and should demand in
police encounters, and it undermines the value of requiring suspicion
as a protection of privacy interests. We also go further and suggest that
randomized stops at suspicion-sufficient checkpoints should be the
focal point of Fourth Amendment reasonableness: randomized
engagement of citizens offers a better constitutional model for
controlling the exercise of police power against individuals. This
satisfies some of the core aims of reasonableness at the heart of the
Fourth Amendment. Two of the most important are controlling police
discretion and avoiding discrimination, whether political, racial, or
other. Our contention is that the Fourth Amendment ought to be
interpreted in a way that best constrains police power and makes it
15 For an overview of random sampling and its practical limitations, see Julian L. Simon and
Paul Burstein, Basic Research Methods in Social Science: The Art of EmpiricalInvestigation 111-19
(Random House 3d ed 1985).
16 In many cases, the construction of profiles is actually based on random sampling. See
Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction:Profiling,Policing,and Punishingin an ActuarialAge 7-16
(Chicago 2007). That was the idea, for instance, behind the IRS audits that were conducted to
create the "Discriminant Index Function" (DIEF) used to flag likely tax evaders. The DIP was last
updated in 1992 based on a multiple-regression analysis of approximately fifty thousand tax returns
that had been randomly audited in 1988. By using random sampling, the IRS can obtain an accurate
picture of suspicious traits at a particular point in time. See id at 9-10, 218. To be sure, there are
dangers in using profiles prospectively if the targeted population is less elastic to policing than the
nontargeted population. See id at 111-44. So using the information prospectively may not be wise.
But what randomization unquestionably affords is an accurate snapshot of the offending
population, and it ensures that the carceral population will accurately reflect all distributions within
the offending population.
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politically accountable to those against whom it is being deployed. In
emphasizing discretion and discrimination, we do not mean to slight
privacy protection. We think that randomization protects privacy by
ensuring an honest and open evaluation of the level of suspicion
necessary to trigger the possibility of police intervention and coercion.
We want to emphasize here that this argument does not require
that we promote suspicionless searches and seizures. Quite to the
contrary, the motivation to eliminate the term "individualized
suspicion" from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is precisely in
order to focus the relevant actors' attention on the amount of
suspicion necessary for constitutionally justified police-civilian
encounters. We advocate a model of randomized searches within
groups of individuals who all satisfy a threshold level of suspicion
consistent with Fourth Amendment values. A threshold level of
suspicion is a critical element to satisfy the constitutional mandate
"against unreasonable searches and seizures."" The amount of
suspicion, not the concept of individualized suspicion, protects our
privacy, and the method of randomization, not retrospective judicial
supervision of discretion,will ensure reasonable searches and seizures.
Two additional observations. First, where that reasonable level of
suspicion should lie is a matter that should be addressed by the
United States Supreme Court in dialogue with the American people.
Accordingly, we will take no position on the matter here. The fact that
this issue has never been squarely addressed by the Court and that,
still today, we have no good idea how much suspicion is enough to
satisfy the constitutional standards of probable cause or articulable
suspicion (under Terry) is the best evidence of the damage that the
concept of "individualized suspicion" has wreaked.
Second, the level of suspicion that attaches to a randomized search
program may often-but will not always-be determinable ex ante.
Once a randomized search program has been put in place, it will be
possible to predict the level of suspicion that will likely attach to future
searches. There will be times, however, when randomized search
programs are implemented without first knowing the exact level of
suspicion attached to the program. In such cases, a compensatory
system should be implemented to provide damages (modeled on
workman's compensation) for the set of individuals burdened by what
ultimately is determined to be an unreasonable checkpoint searchthat is, a search lacking adequate suspicion."
US Const Amend IV.
18 We are not the first to advocate compensating individuals for police encounters through
a regulatory regime. See Richard Lempert, Low Probability/High Consequence Events:
Dilemmas of Damage Compensation, 58 DePaul L Rev 357, 360-61, 390 (2009). Combining a
17
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We begin by discussing the real world and workload of police
officers as a way to set forth, more precisely, our model of suspicion. We
then turn to the constitutional doctrine to demonstrate how our
proposal accords with Fourth Amendment values. Using a case that
illustrates the contours of our argument, City of Indianapolis v
Edmond," we explore what it means to model searches on a suspicionsufficient randomization paradigm. Our argument about why
randomization, and not individualization, is the most helpful construct
for Fourth Amendment reasonableness comes next. Finally, while it is
especially important to distinguish between the constitutional question
of reasonableness and the public policy question of efficient policing,
we explore some objections and implementation issues. It is not always
the case that constitutional requirements and good public policy will
necessarily overlap; however, we believe our constitutional paradigm
allows for best police practices. Naturally, for our paradigm to work
well, a great deal will turn on the pool that is constructed for purposes
of randomization, and so we discuss in some detail the pooling issues.
We also offer a number of examples. One preliminary matter is clear to
us, though: in order to render possible those best practices, a judicial
commitment to a new constitutional paradigm of randomization is
necessary.
I. GROUNDED THEORY: THE REALITY OF POLICE PRACTICES

In 2006, New York Police Department (NYPD) police officers
stopped, questioned, and frisked 508,540 people.20 In 2008, the NYPD
frisked close to 23,000 more people-531,159-a record, but one that
was short-lived. For the calendar year 2009, the NYPD stopped and
interrogated a remarkable 575,304 persons." And 2010 promises to
break even that record.
compensation scheme with randomization, however, is new. See Bruce Ackerman, Before the
NextAttack 54-55 (Yale 2006).
19 531 US 32 (2000), affg Edmond v Goldsmith, 183 F3d 659 (7th Cir 1999).
20 Summary of the RAND Report on NYPD's Stop, Question, and Frisk, Hearing before
the New York City Council Committee on Public Safety and Committee on Civil Rights (2009)
(statement of Greg Ridgeway, RAND Corporation), online at http://www.rand.org/pubs
/testimonies/2009/RANDCT329.pdf (visited Apr 17, 2011). See also New York Civil Liberties
Union (NYCLU), NYPD Stop and Frisk Practices,online at http://www.nyclu.org/stopandfrisk
(visited Apr 17,2011) (explaining that the vast majority of those stopped are black and Latino).
For a detailed description of NYPD frisking procedure, see NYPD, New York City Police
DepartmentPatrolGuide Manual § 208-05 (2006).
21 See NYCLU, NYPD Stop and Frisk Practices (cited in note 20) (noting that, by the
NYPD's own admission, nearly 90 percent of those individuals stopped by police between 2004
and 2010 were completely innocent). See also Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly, New York City
Police DepartmentStop Question & FriskActivity: Reports Preparedduring the PeriodJanuary 1
through Mar 31, 2009, online at http://www.nyclu.org/files/NYPDStop-and-FriskReport
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By contrast, adult felony arrests in New York City represent a
fraction- approximately one-fifth-of these numbers. In 2006, there

were 97,211 felony arrests of adults, of which 27,547 were for violent
crimes and 29,058 for drug-related offenses-and some number of
these grew out of the stop-and-frisk practices." In 2008, there were
99,960 felony arrests of adults, which included 28,324 violent and
28,764 drug-related offenses.2
There is also a Violent Felony Warrant Squad in the NYPD that
tracks down individuals wanted on felony warrants in New York City,
but its numbers are miniscule in comparison to the ordinary felony
arrests. The New York State Police has a Violent Felony Warrant
Squad that works in cooperation with every city and local police
instance, it
department in the state of New York, and in 2000, for
24
arrested 982 persons for violent felonies across the state.
In other words, more than half a million people were stopped and
frisked under a Patrol Model in New York City alone, while less than a
thousand persons were arrested under the paradigmatic Warrant
Model in the entire state of New York.
Even more telling than the raw numbers are the reasons given for
stops, questions, and frisks by the NYPD. The NYPD report for the
first quarter of 2009 lists reasons for stops, reasons for frisks, reasons
for full searches, and additional circumstances that accompanied the
incident. 25 The following tables summarize the totals for each category.
1stQtr2009.pdf (visited Apr 17,2011) ("NYPD Report"); NYCLU, Record Number of Innocent
New Yorkers Stopped, Interrogated by NYPD (May 12, 2009), online at http://www.nyclu.org
/node/2389 (visited Apr 17,2011).
22 Compare New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, Adult Arrests:2001-2010,
online at http://criminatjustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/oisalarrests/NewYorkCity.pdf (visited Apr 17,
2011) (listing total number of arrests per year in New York City by type of offense, and showing a
general decline in total arrests from 2001 to 2005, followed by a dramatic spike in 2007), with
NYCLU, Stop and Frisk Charts, online at http://www.nyclu.org/node/1597 (visited Apr 17, 2011)
(demonstrating that 4 percent of the stop-and-frisks citywide resulted in arrests, and listing "Area
Has a High Crime Incidence," "Furtive Movements," and "Time of Day Fits Crime Incidence" as
the most frequently cited reasons for the stop).
23 See New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, Adult Arrests: 2001-2010
(cited in note 22). There were twice as many adult misdemeanor arrests during the relevant
periods in New York City-206,313 in 2006 and 233,477 in 2008-but those are far more
analogous to order-maintenance policing and the stop-and-frisk model than they are to adult
felony arrest practices. Id.
24 See New York State Division of State Police, State Police Violent Felony Warrant
Squad Arrest Wanted Felon, the Third in 48 Hours (July 12, 2001), online at
http://www.troopers.state.ny.us/PublicInformation/2001_News_Releases/07-12-01_State
PoliceViolentFelonyWarrantSquad arrest wantedfelon,_thejthirdin_48_hours.cfm
(visited Apr 17, 2011). See also Patrice O'Shaughnessy, Warrant Squad Cops Track Worst
Felons, NY Daily News 12 (Jan 20, 2008), online at http://www.nydailynews.com/news
/2008/01/20/2008-01-20_warrantsquad-copsjtrack-worst-felons-3.html#ixzzSQZa3P30
(visited Apr 17, 2011).
2
See NYPD Report at 334-35 (cited in note 21).
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What is striking is how many of the suspicion categories are group
based.
TABLE 1. REASONS FOR STOP
Reason for Stop

Number of Stops

Carrying Suspicious Object
Fits a Relevant Description
Casing a Victim or Location
Suspect Acting as a Lookout
Suspicious Bulge
Other
Actions Indicative of a Drug Transaction
Furtive Movements
Actions of Engaging in a Violent Crime
Wearing Clothes Commonly Used in a Crime

4,122
23,053
51,015
30,121
16,552
34,708
16,124
81,692
14,479
8,856

Source: NYPD Report at 334 (cited in note 21).

TABLE 2. REASONS FOR FRISK
Reason for Frisk

Number of Frisks

Inappropriate Attire for Season
Verbal Threats by Suspect
Knowledge of Suspect's Prior Criminal Behavior
Other Suspicion of Weapons
Furtive Movements
Actions of Engaging in a Violent Crime
Refuse to Comply with Officer's Directions
Violent Crime Suspected
Suspicious Bulge

15,119
1,027
2,223
6,005
64,068
10,822
16,874
18,753
15,900

Source: NYPD Report at 334 (cited in note 21).

TABLE 3. BASIS FOR SEARCH
Basis for Search
Hard Object
Admission by Suspect
Outline of Weapon
Other
Source: NYPD Report at 334 (cited in note 21).

Number of Searches
8,122
548
1,090
6,300

2011]1

Randomization and the FourthAmendment

821

TABLE 4. ADDITIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Additional Circumstances
Report by Victim/Witness
Area Has High Crime Incidence
Time of Day Fits Crime Incidence
Proximity to Scene of Offense
Associating with Known Criminals
Other
Evasive Response to Questioning
Change Direction at Sight of Officer
Ongoing Investigation
Sights or Sounds of Criminal Activity
Radio Run

Number of Cases

a

17,247
97,170

66,996
30,563
5,902
5,568
33,949
43,565

21,301
3,789
40,917

Source: NYPD Report at 334-35 (cited in note 21).

These tables demonstrate well that policing is dominated by
group-based determinations of suspicion.

A. Studies of Police Workload
The place to begin, then, is to look at what the police do on the
ground. Here, the data from New York City are entirely consistent
with the best available research, which suggests that ordermaintenance and preventative policing (the Patrol Model) by far
trumps policing tasks directed to the investigation of serious crimes
(the Warrant Model).
Policing strategies in the United States have varied over time. An
earlier era of "beat policing" was replaced in the 1960s and 1970s-in
large part because of perceived problems of corruption-with a more
professionalized model of policing based on heavy reliance on patrol
cars and dispatching officers through 911-response mechanisms. The
1980s, however, saw the pendulum swing back to beat policing through
the concept of "community policing" that eventually swept across
jurisdictions throughout the country and, now, is viewed as the
dominant and preferred model of policing. 6 The result is that, today,

26 See George L. Kelling, Police and Communities: The Quiet Revolution, in Persp
Policing 1 (National Institute of Justice Report Series No 1, Feb 1988) online at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/law-enforcement/administrationlexecutive-sessions/past.htm
(visited Apr 15, 2011) (describing the "reshaping of American policing" in many communities
toward a strategy that increasingly focuses on the police's "contribution to the quality of
neighborhood life, not just crime statistics"). See also Stephen D. Mastrofski, James J Wills, and
Tammy Rinehart Kochel, The Challenges of Implementing Community Policingin the United
States, 1 Policing: J Pol & Prac 223, 225 (2007); Mark Harrison Moore, Problem-Solving and
Community Policing,15 Crime & Just: Rev Rsrch 99,111-27 (1992).
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policing agencies claim a greater commitment to community-oriented
27
policing than they did thirty years ago.
Much of the research on police workload was conducted during the
period of professionalized policing in the 1960s and 1970s.28 The lessons
from those earlier studies are consistent with and document two
important facts about ordinary policing in both urban and rural settings.
First, police officers spend only a small fraction of their time in contact
with civilians on the street-far less time than we tend to imagine. As one
researcher in the field comments, "A major theme of the earliest studies
concerning urban police officer workload involved dispelling the popular
myth that police spend most of their time protecting the 'thin blue line'
between law and order ... by highlighting the predominance of time

spent performing service and order maintenance functions."29 The second
consistent finding is that, of that small portion of their workload
dedicated to crime fighting, police officers spend a greater share in their
order-maintenance capacity than in their crime-solving capacity. The
early studies, in effect, revealed that police officers spent little of their
time in reactive crime-solving activities." Since the advent of community
policing, a number of studies have returned to the workload question in
part to determine whether community-oriented officers are in fact more
involved with the community and perform even more service-oriented
tasks."

27
See Michael D. Reisig, Community and Problem-OrientedPolicing, 39 Crime & Just:
Rev Rsrch 1, 1-2 (2010). See also Roger B. Parks, et al, How Officers Spend Their Time with the
Community, 16 Just Q 483, 514-15 (1999); Gordon P Whitaker, What Is Patrol Work?, 4 Police
Stud 13,13-17 (Winter 1982).
28 See Brad W. Smith, Kenneth J. Novak, and James Frank, Community Policing and the
Work Routines of Street-Level Officers, 26 Crim Just Rev 17,17 (2001). For a sample of the early
workload studies, see Elaine Cummings, Ian Cummings, and Laura Edell, Policeman as
Philosopher,Guide and Friend, 12 Soc Probs 276, 285-86 (1965); Thomas E. Bercal, Calls for
Police Assistance. Consumer Demands for Government Service, 13 Am Behav Scientist 681, 689
(1970); John A. Webster, Police Task and Time Study, 61 J Crim L, Criminol, & Police Sci 94, 100
(1970); Albert J. Reiss Jr, The Police and the Public 63-102 (Yale 1971); Gary W. Cordner, Police
PatrolWork Load Studies:A Review and Critique,2 Police Stud 50,57 (Summer 1979); Stephen
D. Mastrofski, The Police and Non-crime Services, in Gordon P. Whitaker and Charles David
Phillips, eds, EvaluatingPerformanceof CriminalJusticeAgencies 33,43 (Sage 1983).
29 John Liederbach, Addressing the "Elephant in the Living Room": An Observational
Study of the Work of Suburban Police,28 Policing: Intl J Police Strat & Mgmt 415,431 (2005).
30
See Cummings, Cummings, and Edell, 12 Soc Probs at 284 (cited in note 28); Bercal,
13 Am Behav Scientist at 688-89 (cited in note 28); Reiss, The Police and the Public at 95 (cited
in note 28);Webster, 61 J Crim L, Criminol, & Police Sci at 95 (cited in note 28).
31 See Smith, Novak, and Frank, 26 Crim Just Rev at 32 (cited in note 28); Parks, et al,
16 Just Q at 500 (cited in note 27); Liederbach, 28 Policing: Intl J Police Strat & Mgmt at 430-31
(cited in note 29); James Frank, Steven G. Brandl, and R. Cory Watkins, The Content of
Community Policing:A Comparison of the Daily Activities of Community and "Beat" Officers,
20 Policing: Intl J Police Strat & Mgmt 716,725-26 (1997).
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The Warrant Model and the Patrol Model of policing do not
perfectly map on to the workload studies we review here because the
research categories are a bit larger and broader. Nevertheless, it is
possible to find relatively good proxies for these two different models,
and when we do, it is clear that the Patrol Model dominates the
Warrant Model. Even a crude measure of police tasks makes clear
that police officers today spend a greater amount of their time in the
kind of preemptive, preventative, and investigative type of policing
activities that are associated with group-probability assessments than
they spend in the kind of crime-response or warrant-execution types
of activities that are associated with defined or identified suspicion.
We review three recent studies here.
One of the most reliable and interesting studies details and
compares the workload of community-oriented police officers (known
as "COP officers") to more traditional crime-solving police officers
(known as "beat officers") in the same police department in Cincinnati,
Ohio. The data were collected using systematic social observationactual observations of police officers by trained social scientists -during
a thirteen-month period from April 1997 through April 1998." In all, the
researchers studied 31 different COP officers over 1,648 hours and 131
different beat officers over 1,888 hours, spanning a total of 442 police
shifts over 3,536 hours. Minute by minute, the researchers coded the
work activities of the observed officers by 125 different categories of
activities and encounters. The activities categories were defined as noncontact because they included behaviors that did not involve face-toface interaction with civilians. The encounter categories, on the other
hand, involved personal interactions between a police officer and a
citizen. Every minute of an observed police officer's activity was coded
using 23 different activity categories and 102 different encounter
categories. These categories were then aggregated into a sixteencategory list of workload, ranging from "Personal" and "En
route/waiting" to "Administrative," "Order maintenance," and
"Ordinance enforcement.""
For our purposes, the most important encounter categories are
those that involve, on the one hand, "Crime incidents," and, on the
other hand, "Investigative," "Order maintenance," and "Traffic
enforcement." The first category, "Crime incidents," corresponds more
closely to our model of warrant policing. It does not map on exactly,
and is probably broader, but it is the closest category. It is defined as
"[aictivities involving a response to a violation of criminal law, for
32
33

Smith, Novak, and Frank, 26 Crim Just Rev at 22-23 (cited in note 28).
Id at 22-25.
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example searching property, serving warrants, or responding to crime
calls (e.g., burglary)."" Serving warrants, clearly, maps on to our
category well, but responding to crime calls is also more likely to
trigger encounters with identified suspects -especially in domestic
abuse cases or where there are acquaintance crimes. The second
category is intended to get at more proactive police tasks that tend to
include stops, questioning, and frisks-and more closely maps onto
our model of patrol policing. This category includes three rubrics. The
first, "Investigative," is defined as "[a]ctivities involving an unknown
problem (e.g., checking out suspicious circumstances, alarm response,
or interrogation)." The second, "Order maintenance," is defined as
"[p]roportion of time spent on activities intended to maintain or
restore order, such as attempting to keep the peace and dealing with
public nuisance problems (i.e., disorderly, drunk, noise disturbance, or
arguments)." And the third, "Traffic enforcement," is defined as
"[a]ctivities involving vehicles or the roadways, for example traffic
enforcement, traffic or road problems, road block, or accidents.",3
What the Ohio study reveals is that, first, consistent with earlier
studies, the bulk of a police officer's workload does not involve civilian
contact or crime-fighting activities. Police officers spend more than 75
percent of their time in activities that involve either no contact with
citizens or no crime-related activities.36 This is, of course, an ancillary
point, but it remains true even in today's more community-oriented
policing models.
But second, and more importantly, the typical police officer,
whether a COP officer or a beat officer, spends more of her time on
proactive patrol-model policing than on reactive crime-solving and
warrant-type policing. Beat officers, for instance, spend about seventysix minutes per shift (or 16 percent of their shift) on average engaged
in Patrol Model tasks and fifty-eight minutes (or 12 percent of their
shift) in Warrant Model activities." Even using these very rough
measures of the warrant versus patrol models, police officers in this
jurisdiction are spending a greater portion of time in their shifts
Id at 30.
Id at 37 (explaining their research methods). The other activity categories are of little
interest to us either because they exclude civilian contact or because they have nothing to do
with crime. So, for instance, "Foot patrol" and "Motor patrol," which are defined as "[p]roportion
of time spent patrolling on foot" or "in vehicle," respectively, do not include the interaction time
with civilians, whereas "Service," which is defined as "[alctivities providing service or assistance
to citizens, for example assisting motorists, returning lost property, giving information, providing
medical assistance, assisting a citizen locked out of a building, or giving directions," is not crime
related. Id.
36 Smith, Novak, and Frank, 26 Crim Just Rev at 37 (cited in note 28).
37
See id at 26.
34

35
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engaged in the preemptive, preventative tasks of investigating
suspicious behavior and maintaining order.
A second study, conducted by James Frank, Steven Brandl, and
R. Cory Watkins, compared the tasks and workloads of traditional
crime-solving officers ("beat officers") to neighborhood officers ("COP
officers").38 The data were collected using systematic observations
between January and August 1995 in Cincinnati, Ohio, as part of a
larger study on the effectiveness of community policing efforts." Over
the course of the study, the researchers examined sixteen community
police officers and fourteen beat officers assigned to the same
neighborhoods as the community police officers." Each officer was
observed during two eight-hour shifts; observations of COP officers
occurred during fifty-nine shifts (totaling 432.20 hours), while
observations of beat officers occurred during twenty shifts (totaling
171.48 hours)."
The researchers distinguished between crime-related activities
and other kinds of service and administrative activities. Crime-related
activities involved a specific reported criminal occurrence and
included such tasks as "serving warrants on suspects, making arrests,
issuing citations, conducting investigations involving specific
occurrences, and preparing reports related to specific criminal
incidents."42 The study revealed that both beat officers and COP
officers spent most of their crime-related time conducting vehicle and
foot patrol, as compared to the amount of time actually engaged in
effectuating an arrest. The activity with the greatest frequency was
"Vehicle patrol," which accounted for 22.01 percent of a COP officer's
time and 32.97 percent of a beat officer's time.43 By contrast, making
arrests accounted for only 0.90 percent of a COP officer's time and
6.48 percent of a beat officer's time." As the authors emphasized,
"almost one-third (32.97 percent) of all patrol officer time was spent
performing routine vehicle patrol."
This is even more true in rural, small town, and suburban police
forces, which spend an even greater proportion of their time engaged
in the kind of traffic enforcement activities that are generally
3
See Frank, Brandl, and Watkins, 20 Policing: Intl J Police Strat & Mgmt at 718-20 (cited
in note 31).
39 See id at 717.
4
See id at 719.
41 See id at 719-20.
42 Frank, Brandl, and Watkins, 20 Policing: Intl J Police Strat & Mgmt at 720 (cited in
note 31).
43 See id at 724 table II (beat officer); id at 721 table I (COP officer).
44 Seeidat721,724.

45

Id at 723.
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associated with preemptive policing-and also, tragically, in this
country, with racial profiling. A number of studies have focused on the
smaller police agencies in small towns and rural places-policing
Mayberry, as it were -and the findings converge here as well..
In a third study, a recent observational study of the workload of
the suburban police that used very similar methods and categories-in
order to be able to precisely compare their findings with the existing
studies on urban forces-the author, John Liederbach, discovered far
more time spent on traffic enforcement. This study, too, relied on
systematic social observation conducted over a fourteen-month period
between April 1999 and May 2000, involving 3,537 hours of observation
(the equivalent of 442 eight-hour shifts)." The study sites included
fourteen different suburban police agencies in Hamilton County, Ohio,
with very diverse demographic, socioeconomic, and land use variations.
Two of the communities were exclusive upper income, three were
middle income residential, two middle income diversified, one middle
income integrated, three working class residential, and three working
class urbanized. The study utilized the same coding instruments,
including both activity and encounter categories."
We can draw four conclusions from this study. First, suburban
police officers spent 83 percent of their time on activities that involved
no contact with civilians." Second, and more importantly, traffic
enforcement was one of the five dominant uses of time and, of those
five, the only one involving civilian encounters (the other four top
activities were motorized patrol, administrative tasks such as report
writing, personal off-duty tasks, and traveling en route to specific
locations).so Third, of all citizen encounters, traffic enforcement (again)
was the most time consuming, representing 30.1 percent on average of
police-citizen encounters, in contrast, for example, to 19.1 percent for
crime-related activities. Traffic problems "consumed the largest
percentage of encounter time" in a large majority of the suburban
agencies, as compared to at least nine other categories of tasks
(including crime related, investigative, and order maintenance)."
46 See, for example, John Liederbach and James Frank, Policing Mayberry: The Work
Routines of Small-Town and Rural Officers, 28 Am J Crim Just 53, 69-70 (2003); Ralph A.
Weisheit, David N. Falcone, and L. Edward Wells, Crime and Policing in Rural and Small Town
America 77 (Waveland 1996); Liederbach, 28 Policing: Intl J Police Strat & Mgmt at 430 (cited in
note 29).
47 See Liederbach, 28 Policing: Intl J Police Strat & Mgmt at 419-20 (cited in note 29).
See id at 421-23 (noting that, depending on their length and whether they included
4
"police business,"interactions with citizens could be coded "brief," "casual," or "full").
49 See id at 423.
50 See id at 424.
51 See Liederbach, 28 Policing: Intl J Police Strat & Mgmt at 425 (cited in note 29).

2011]1

Randomization and the FourthAmendment

827

Together, traffic enforcement, investigations, and order maintenance
clearly outweighed the other civilian contact hours. Fourth, the
amount of time engaged in actually serving warrants was miniscule.
The study coded the number of times that police officers encountered
different types of problem interactions with civilians, and the tally is
revealing.
TABLE 5. QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON OF PATROL VERSUS
WARRANT-TYPE POLICE ENCOUNTERS WITH CIVILIANS

Type of Problem
Patrol-type encounters:
1. Traffic problems

Number of Civilian Encounters
714

2. Investigative problems

197

3. Order maintenance problems

159

Subtotal
Warrant-type encounters:
1. Warrant to be served
2.

Other crime problems
Subtotal

1,070
37
378
415

Source: Liederbach, 28 Policing: Intl J Police Strat & Mgmt at 427-29 (cited in note 29).

The author concluded that these findings "show the
predominance of traffic issues for suburban officers in terms of both
the large degree of time that traffic problems consumed and the
frequency with which these officers encountered traffic problems
while on shift."" The author emphasized that "[s]ix of the top
problems were traffic related. Excess speed was the most frequently
encountered problem as a whole, and traffic was the primary problem
in 29.7 percent of all citizen encounters across the fourteen agencies.""
These findings are very similar to the findings in small town and rural
police departments.
In addition to these three often cited studies, a 2009 study
examining the time allocated to proactive and reactive activities by

52
53
54

Id at 427.
Id.
See note 46 and accompanying text.
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traditional and community officers provides further support." This
study, by Christine Famega, focused more directly on the workload
difference between preemptive, proactive policing methods in the
mold of the Patrol Model and more reactive, 911-response policing in
the mold of the Warrant Model.
Using a method of systematic observation of officers similar to
that used in the three earlier studies, the Famega study collected data
during a two-week period in 1999." Trained observers accompanied
officers during 251 shifts, took notes of the officers' activities during
each shift, and recorded 180 types of officer conduct.8 These observed
activities were then classified as either proactive (defined as any
"activity initiated by the officer, initiated in response to a citizen at the
scene, or based on information of instructions provided by the
police") or reactive (defined as any "activity conducted in response to
a 911, 311, or district dispatch")."
Consistent with earlier studies, the research found that the
greatest proportion of officers' proactive time was consumed by patrol
activities (34.76 percent for beat officers and approximately 30
percent for community-oriented officers). Proactive policing far
outweighs reactive policing: beat officers "spend approximately 21%
of their time engaged in reactive activities, 50% of their time engaged
in proactive activities, and 29% of their time engaged in other
activities.""
Although none of the studies map on perfectly to the Patrol
Model versus Warrant Model and are, in this sense, only rough proxies
for our distinction, each one of them corroborates the central insight
that policing today involves far more group-based preemptive
suspicion than warrant-like encounters focused on a particular
individual. Famega's study may come closest, and its conclusion serves
well here:
Overall, 50% of [beat] officer time is spent engaged in proactive
activities, as compared to 29% of time engaged in administrative
and personal activities (other activities), and 21% of time is spent

s5 See Christine N. Famega, Proactive Policing by Post and Community Officers, 55 Crime
& Delinquency 78,98 (2009).
56 The author's own description is instructive. She notes that the point of the study is to
distinguish "between reactive policing, in which citizens mobilize the police to intervene in
private affairs (typically through calls for service), and proactive policing, in which police
intervene on their own initiative." Id at 78-79.
57 See id at 86.
58 See id at 87-88.
59
Famega,55 Crime & Delinquency at 88 (cited in note 55).
60 Id at 90.
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on reactive activities. Clearly, [beat] officers have a good deal of
time for proactive work, though most of it is spent on patrol.
B. Modeling Suspicion and Police Practices
The empirical evidence and workload research suggest a couple
of ways of visualizing our main point. The first works in one
dimension, along a spectrum delineated by the two opposing ideal
types of police-civilian encounters-the Warrant and the Patrol
Models. At one end of the spectrum lies the warrant type of
encounter: for instance, the situation where the police have unique
identifying information concerning a specific individual, such as the
spouse batterer who has committed the act in front of the police or
the individual bearing Roman Polanski's passport. This type of
encounter is what we have characterized as fitting into a Warrant
Model of policing. At the other extreme lies a more speculative groupbased identification of a person for an encounter: for instance, a
situation involving an apparent truant with a bulge in his pocket, or
someone who fits the description of the perpetrator of a recent armed
robbery, or an individual who seems to be casing a car or a store.
These types of situations, when they give rise to an investigative stop
or search, are what we have characterized as fitting into a Patrol
Model of policing.
The police research suggests that most police-civilian encounters
are arrayed along this spectrum ranging from warrant to patrol
models of policing. Not entirely coincidentally, the spectrum also
coincides with the range of probabilities of suspicion. The warranttype encounters are stacked on the side of higher probabilities of
suspicion, while the patrol-type encounters are arrayed toward the
lower end of the probabilities scale. We believe, and research
demonstrates, that most police work loads onto the Patrol Model end
of the spectrum as opposed to the Warrant Model end, which is also to
say that most of the time when police officers engage people, they are
operating on the basis of a probability of suspicion that is far smaller
than 1.This is illustrated in Figure 1.

61

Id at 98.
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FIGURE 1.
Patrol Model of Policing

Probability = 0

Warrant Model of Policing

Probability

1

Batterer arrest;
Polanski arrest

Amount of suspicion necessary to satisfy
"reasonable suspicion" under the Fourth
Amendment

As Figure 1 suggests, there are, on the right-hand side, a limited
number of police encounters that come close to the execution of an
arrest warrant for a fugitive or for an accused who committed his
crime on videotape. These are the extreme cases where the level of
suspicion is close to 1 on a probability scale and where the proper
model to evaluate reasonable suspicion may as well be binary. The
suspect is "the one" in most of these warrant model cases. Reconsider
our previous example of a police officer who witnesses a known
batterer beat his wife. Again, the suspect here is almost surely the
right person. To the left of that small set of cases, though, is the vast
majority of policing encounters. These cases are far more speculative,
and the probability that the suspect is in fact guilty of a crime ranges
widely. Individuals may be suspected because they fit a description
(young black male near the scene of the robbery), or fit a suspect
behavior (glancing furtively while "casing" an establishment), or
demonstrate a suspect trait (wearing a heavy overcoat in the summer
heat or displaying a bulge in his pants pocket). The probability of the
suspicion varies in all of these cases based on the group-based nature
of the suspicious trait or behavior. There is no "on" or "off" of
individual suspicion here; rather, there are just levels of suspicion that
may or may not meet constitutional muster. Somewhere along that
spectrum, the Supreme Court must draw the line of reasonableness.
Our point can also be represented two dimensionally. The first
dimension (x-axis) has to do with whether the police have identified a
particular individual or whether the police are engaged in purely
preventative policing. The second dimension (y-axis) has to do with
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whether there is a crime that has occurred and needs to be solved or
whether the police are merely policing to prevent crimes from
happening. The two dimensions give rise, essentially, to a two-by-two
graph where the Patrol Model cases (white) can be distinguished from
the Warrant Model incidents (grey).
FIGURE 2.
Crime Has Occurred
(911 Model)
Battering Spouse
with Police Witness;

Roman Polanski

0
Oneontas Case
Suspect ID

Ordinary Street Stops
Al Capone's
Future Crimes

O

The vast majority of policing
happens in thi quadrant

Preemptive Preventative Policing
(Crime Prevention Model)

In the upper-left quadrant, the prototypical case is that of an
identified individual who has been accused of an identifiable crimesay, the battering husband or Roman Polanksi. These cases fit the
Warrant Model. The upper-right-hand quadrant contains cases, like
the famous case of Brown v City of Oneonta,6 where a crime has been
committed and all the police have is an eyewitness lead based on
some general demographic traits.63 The witness identification there led
to the interrogation and search of the hands of all the young African

62 221 F3d 329 (2d Cir 2000).
63 See id at 333-34.
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Americans in the town.' This qualifies as the Patrol Model. In the
lower-left quadrant there are oddball cases of identified persons
whose crime has not yet been identified perfectly-for instance, Al
Capone.6 These few cases would be characterized as warrant-type
investigations. In the bottom-right quadrant, well, that is the bulk of
policing: cases of ordinary street stops.
It should be clear by now that the vast majority of police work
covers the bottom-right part of the graph. In that quadrant (and in the
adjoining area above), the reasonableness of the suspicion bears little
relationship to a model that targets a particular individual. In these
cases, we do not really care that suspicion attaches to an individual
qua individual, rather than to the individual as a member of a group.
What we care about is the level of suspicion that attaches to the group
of individuals who are identified as sharing whatever combination of
traits, conditions, or behaviors and how reliably that level of suspicion
can be demonstrated. The police do not need individualized suspicion
in these cases. What they need is the right quantum of probabilistic
suspicion for the group. Once one accepts this point, it should be clear
that adding the word "individualized" to suspicion is not helpful to
answering the central question in these Fourth Amendment cases:
whether the police activity is "reasonable."
In truth, the only way to make semantic sense of the term
"individualized suspicion" in the vast majority of cases that lie in the
lower right quadrant of the table would be to require that the
intersection of suspicious group-based traits, conditions, and behaviors
identify a unique individual. Obviously, that requirement would
represent a degree of certainty of suspicion that is exponentially
greater than the level of suspicion that courts conventionally attach to
the term "individualized suspicion" in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Such a requirement would defy common sense, and
most people would likely find it intolerable.
We do not think it is necessary or desirable to reduce the
quantum of suspicion necessary to satisfy the Fourth Amendment in
order to pursue the goal of randomization. Our goal instead is to
propose a constitutional framework that allows courts to better define

64 Id at 334 (noting that, because the witness had told police that the assailant had cut his
hand during the attack, police inspected the hands of over two hundred nonwhite residents of
Oneonta).
65
See Daniel C. Richman and William 3. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of PretextualProsecution, 105 Colum L Rev 583, 583-84 (2005) (noting that
"Al Capone [remains] the poster child for pretextual prosecution" because, although the
government strongly suspected him of serious crimes such as murder and racketeering, it opted
instead to prosecute him for the lesser charge of tax evasion).
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and track the level of suspicion that police officers and agencies need
in order to satisfy constitutional mandates. By paying attention to the
level of suspicion in searches and seizures, rather than the
individualization of suspicion, courts will be in a better position to
give meaning to the notion of reasonableness.
II. RETHINKING FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES

The Supreme Court has debated the pros and cons of randomized
search programs in a number of discrete Fourth Amendment
contexts-such as border patrol roadblocks as well as administrative
6
and public school drug-testing programs. In all of these situations, the
Court has considered the propriety of extending the requirement of
"individualized suspicion" outside the nucleus of police and crimerelated searches and seizures. It is important to emphasize at the
outset, though, that in all of those other areas the notion of
"individualized suspicion" is opposed to suspicionless searches and
seizures. The debate is not between "individualized suspicion" versus
a probabilistic notion of suspicion like ours. The debate is always cast
in terms of a choice between "individualized suspicion" on the one
hand and no suspicion at all on the other.
The Court has repeatedly made clear that the exceptional
categories of searches that are exempt from the "individualized
suspicion" requirement fall under the rubric of "suspicionless searches
and seizures."' As Justice Antonin Scalia emphasized in the public
school drug-testing context, "We have upheld suspicionless searches
and seizures to conduct drug testing of railroad personnel involved in
train accidents; to conduct random drug testing of federal customs
officers who carry arms or are involved in drug interdiction; and to
maintain automobile checkpoints looking for illegal immigrants and
contraband."8
In that debate-the debate between suspicion-full and suspicionless
searches and seizures-we fall on the side of requiring suspicion,
especially in the policing context. We believe that reasonable searches
66 See United States v Martinez-Fuerte,428US 543,562 (1976); Board of Education v Earls,
536 US 822,836 (2002); Vernonia School District471 v Acton, 515 US 646,661-65 (1995).
67
See, for example, Vernonia, 515 US at 653-54 (emphasis added); id at 667-68 (O'Connor
dissenting) ("For most of our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless searches have been
generally considered per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.")
(emphasis added).
68 Id at 653-54 (majority) (emphasis added).
69 We are interested only in the policing context and, for that reason, do not really engage
the question of the propriety of suspicionless searches in administrative or other nonpolicing
contexts, such as the issue presented in Ferguson v City of Charleston,532 US 67 (2001). We lean
in favor of requiring suspicion in those contexts, too, though the level of suspicion could be set
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and seizures in the policing context require a certain level of suspicion.
What we argue, though, is that it is precisely the level of suspicion that
should be the focus of the reasonableness inquiry7 -along with the
evenhandedness of the searches. Search programs that reveal levels of
suspicion that fall below constitutional minimums are inappropriate in
the criminal justice context; what reasonableness and privacy require are
a certain acceptable quantum of suspicion. In this sense, we do not
espouse suspicionless mass searches, but rather randomized programs
that meet target levels of suspicion. We acknowledge that the level of
suspicion may need to be determined ex post in certain cases and, as a
result, would need to go hand in hand with a compensation mechanism
for those randomized programs that do not meet the minimum level of
suspicion. We address this in Part IV.B.
A. Suspicionless Search Programs
The Court has addressed the question of suspicionless search
programs in a number of different situations. As a doctrinal matter,
the framing of the question is identical in all of the "exceptional cases"
where suspicionless searches are or are not deemed constitutional. As
the Supreme Court made clear in a number of early cases, the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant Clause is not applicable to all searches and
seizures, especially not to those that are conducted on the street in a
volatile or fluid context." The Warrant Clause does not apply to
searches of cars, since they might move,2 or to suspects on the street
during unanticipated encounters." As such, the probable cause
requirement specified in the Warrant Clause also does not attach. The
Court has, however, imposed the same requirement of probable
cause-and subsequently, in certain situations, of articulable
suspicion-as the standard to evaluate reasonableness under the more
general "reasonableness" subclause of the Fourth Amendment. It is
the probable cause standard that has evolved, over time, into the
requirement that there be "individualized suspicion." All of this is
standard fare.
lower and established after the fact; but we have no deep stake in taking a position outside the
criminal justice context.
70 For a similar argument, see Christopher Slobogin, The World without a Fourth
Amendment, 39 UCLA L Rev 1, 38-75 (1991).
71 See Carrollv United States, 267 US 132,146 (1925); Payton v New York, 445 US 573,576
(1980). See also US Const Amend IV.
72
Carroll,267 US at 162 (holding that police were not required to obtain a warrant for the
search of a car).
73 United States v Watson, 423 US 411,423-24 (1976) ("[The judgment of the Nation and
Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause rather
than to encumber criminal prosecutions with endless litigation.").
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In a line of Fourth Amendment cases, however, the Supreme
Court has drawn exceptions to the "individualized suspicion"
requirement. These exceptional situations traditionally have lain
outside the conventional crime and policing contexts and have been
justified on the grounds of necessity or efficacy. As Justice O'Connor
explained, dissenting in Vernonia School District 47J v Acton,'4 the
public school drug-testing case, "[W]e have allowed exceptions in
recent years only where it has been clear that a suspicion-based
regime would be ineffectual."7' As a result, and as the Court declared
in one of the first such cases, Skinner v Railway Labor Executives'

Association,' involving a drug-testing scheme for railroad engineers
involved in a train accident, "In limited circumstances, where the
privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be
placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a
search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.""
These cases, in fact, have spawned a constitutional maxim of their
own: "the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of
such [individualized] suspicion."
The Court has articulated a number of exceptions to suspicionbased search regimes in discrete areas such as randomized drug
testing in public schools and suspicionless roadblocks at or near the
border. These are the cases that have given rise to what the Court
refers to as "the closely guarded category of constitutionally
permissible suspicionless searches.""
1. Drug testing in public schools.
The first line of cases-Vernonia School District47J v Acton and
Board of Education v Earls"o-involve suspicionless drug testing in

public schools. In Vernonia, the Court, with Justice Scalia writing, held
that random drug testing of student athletes did not violate the Fourth
Amendment."' During the 1980s, drug use in Vernonia schools had
increased sharply, or so the majority found, and athletes were
515 US 646 (1995).
Id at 667-68 (O'Connor dissenting).
76 489 US 602 (1989).
77 Id at 624-25.
78 The famous passage is originally from Martinez-Fuerte,428 US at 560-61, and has been
repeated in myriad subsequent cases. See, for example, Vernonia, 515 US at 643; New Jersey v
TL.O., 469 US 325,342 n 8 (1985); Earls, 536 US at 829-30; Samson v California,547 US 843,
855 n 4 (2006).
79 Earas,536 US at 854 (Ginsburg dissenting). See also Chandlerv Miller, 520 US 305,309 (1997).
so 536 US 822 (2002).
81 515 US at 664-65.
74
75
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perceived as the "leaders of the drug culture."8 After exploring a
variety of alternatives, the school district implemented a policy
directing school officials to randomly choose 10 percent of student
athletes to drug test each week. If a student tested positive, then that
student had to participate in a six-week assistance program or suffer
suspension from athletics for the remainder of the current season and
the subsequent season.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia considered a threefactor test to ascertain whether "individualized suspicion" was
necessary-looking first at the nature of the privacy interest at stake,
second at the nature of the privacy invasion, and third at the nature
and immediacy of the governmental concern.' Because legitimate
privacy expectations are attenuated in a school setting (and to an even
greater degree in student athletic settings), because the results of the
test were disclosed to others only on a "need to know" basis, and
because the state has a strong interest in deterring drug use among
schoolchildren, Justice Scalia concluded that random drug testing did
not violate the Fourth Amendment."
Seven years later, in Board of Education v Earls, the Court

expanded its decision in Vernonia to hold that mandatory drug testing
for all students who participated in extracurricular activities was
constitutional. The Court rejected the Tenth Circuit's holding that a
school must be able to identify drug abuse among a sufficient number
of students and demonstrate that the testing will actually capture
those groups of students." Applying Vernonia's "fact-specific balancing
inquiry," Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the Court, found that
students participating in extracurricular activities had only a limited
expectation of privacy and that the intrusion on their privacy was
minor because the information was distributed on a "need to know"
basis and no authorities would be notified." The Court also found that
the nature and immediacy of protecting schoolchildren's health-even
absent a factual showing of a serious drug problem -was a sufficiently
important government interest."

Id at 648-49.
Id at 650-51.
8
See id at 654-64.
85 See Vernonia,515 US at 664-65.
See Earls, 536 US at 838 (holding that, since the school's drug-testing policy was
8
constitutional in light of its custodial responsibilities toward its students, it need not focus solely
on those students most likely to be using drugs).
8
See Earls v Board ofEducation, 242 F3d 1264,1278 (10th Cir 2001), revd 536 US 822 (2002).
8
See Earls,536 US at 833.
89 See id at 834-38.
82
83
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The public school drug-testing cases gave rise to a sharp debate
between, on the one hand, Justices Scalia and Thomas, and, on the
other hand, Justices O'Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. All made
significant use of history-the first two by its absence, the second two
by its presence. Justice Scalia's historical search for "clear practices" at
the time of adoption left little room for reasoning by analogy. Because
public schools did not exist at the time the Fourth Amendment was
adopted and the drug problem (and related technology) is of more
recent vintage, Justice Scalia found that no sufficiently analogous
searches existed and therefore relied on the plain meaning of the text.
"As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure
of the constitutionality of a governmental search is 'reasonableness.'"
And, where there was no clear practice either approving or
disapproving the type of search at issue at the time the constitutional
provision was enacted, whether a particular search meets the
reasonableness standard "is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interest."91
Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, relied on the Court's
historical treatment of the Fourth Amendment. Although the text of
the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly require individualized
suspicion, Justice O'Connor argued in dissent that, "[flor most of our
constitutional history, mass, suspicionless searches have been generally
considered per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment."92 Justice O'Connor relied heavily on Carroll v United
States," in which the Court stated in 1925 that "[i]t would be
intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to
stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject
all persons lawfully using the highways to the indignity of such a
search."" Justice O'Connor used several historical studies to bolster
her claim that the Framers believed that blanket searches were
"intolerable and unreasonable" and intended to codify that conviction
into the Fourth Amendment."
9 Vernonia, 515 US at 652-53.
91 Id, quoting Skinner, 489 US at 619.
92
Vernonia,515 US at 667-68 (O'Connor dissenting).
93 267 US 132 (1925).
94 Id at 153-54.
95 Justice O'Connor mentions the following scholarly resources: William J. Cuddihy, The
FourthAmendment: Originsand OriginalMeaning 602-1791 (Oxford 2009);Thomas K. Clancy,
The Role of IndividualizedSuspicion in Assessing the Reasonablenessof Searches and Seizures,
25 U Memphis L Rev 483 (1994); Tracey Maclin, When the Curefor the Fourth Amendment Is
Worse Than the Disease,68 S Cal L Rev 1 (1994); Leonard W. Levy, OriginalIntent and the
Framers'Constitution (MacMillan 1988).
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The fact is that the debate is narrowly circumscribed, rests on
common legal ground, and is limited to a disagreement over the
effectiveness of suspicion-based search programs. Both sides agree
that "individualized suspicion" is not required in all contexts and that
the effectiveness of a search program is key to the determination.
They disagree, however, as to the effectiveness of suspicion-based
searches in the public school context. Thus, Justice O'Connor wrote:
"[Wie have allowed exceptions in recent years only where it has been
clear that a suspicion based regime would be ineffectual."" In a
surprisingly similar passage, Justice Scalia argued that, because the
Fourth Amendment has "no irreducible requirement of suspicion,"7 in
situations where it would be "impracticable" due to "special needs" to
determine individualized suspicion, a search will not violate the
Fourth Amendment." Both sides agree that there ought to be a
preference for suspicion, but the crux of their disagreement is over the
technical effectiveness of the search programs.
2. Border Patrol roadblocks.
In another line of cases culminating in United States v MartinezFuerte," the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of fixed
immigration checkpoints and there, too, held that suspicionless searches
passed constitutional muster-more specifically, that Border Patrol
agents require no articulable suspicion to stop and question motorists at
a roadblock within one hundred miles of the Mexican border.'
The Martinez-Fuerte case arose from arrests made at two
different permanent immigration checkpoints within one hundred
miles of the Mexican border: one in California, the other in Texas.
Both checkpoints were marked in the traditional fashion with large
black-on-yellow signs and flashing lights and subsequent warning
signs as motorists got closer. At the first checkpoint in San Clemente,
California, the point agent visually screened all northbound traffic, but
did not conduct questioning there. Instead the agent would select a
number of motorists for further investigation at a secondary
inspection site, where other agents would stop and question the
motorists about their citizenship and immigration status. At the time
of the arrests at the San Clemente checkpoint, a magistrate had issued
a "warrant of inspection" that authorized the Border Patrol to
Vernonia,515 US at 668 (O'Connor dissenting).
Id at 653, quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US at 560-61.
98 Vernonia, 515 US at 653, quoting Griffin v Wisconsin, 483 US 868,973 (1987).
9 428 US 543 (1976).
1o See id at 566-67.
96
97
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conduct roadblock operations at the site."o' At the Sarita, Texas,
checkpoint, Border Patrol officers would stop all northbound traffic
for brief questioning, with the exception of local residents whom the
officers recognized. In contrast to the San Clemente checkpoint, there
was no judicial warrant regarding the operations at Sarita.'0
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that neither articulable
suspicion nor a judicial warrant was necessary as a precondition for a
search at an immigration roadblock within one hundred miles of the
border."' In other words, no suspicion was required. Justice Lewis
Powell wrote the opinion for the Court and began by considering the
balance of interests. Permanent checkpoints, the government argued,
were "the most important of the traffic-checking operations.".. They
were also highly effective, Justice Powell suggested. The San Clemente
checkpoint, for instance, resulted in the apprehension of seventeen
thousand illegal aliens in 1973 from about ten million cars that passed
through the checkpoint.10o Their effectiveness, Justice Powell intimated,
would be greatly diminished if stops had to be based on reasonable
suspicion; such a requirement
would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too
heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would
enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens. In
particular, such a requirement would largely eliminate any
deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling operations,
even though smugglers are known to use these highways
regularly. 6
By contrast, the intrusion on liberty was relatively minor-in
Justice Powell's words, "quite limited."'o' All that was required of
travelers was a "brief detention," "a response to a brief question or
two," and "possibly the production of a document evidencing a right
to be in the United States."'0 Justice Powell emphasized that the
subjective intrusion was "appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint
stop."'0 These stops involve less discretion on the part of the agents,

101 See id at 545-50.
102 See id at 549-50.
103 See Martinez-Fuerte,428 US at 566-67 (limiting the holding to the "types of stops
described in [the] opinion-that is, stops that are brief, routine, and conducted at permanent
checkpoints").
'0
Id at 556-57.
105 See id at 554.
106 Id at 557.
107 Martinez-Fuerte,428 US at 557.
108 Id at 558, quoting United States v Brignoni-Ponce,422 US 873,880 (1975).
109 Martinez-Fuerte,428 US at 558.
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less interference with legitimate traffic, and less potential for abuse.
Even the secondary stops at the San Clemente checkpoint, Justice
Powell argued, were relatively minor. Those referrals were "made for
the sole purpose of conducting a routine and limited inquiry into
residence status" and involved an "objective intrusion" that "remains
minimal.,"' "Selective referral may involve some annoyance, but it
remains true that the stops should not be frightening or offensive
because of their public and relatively routine nature."" As a result,
and because of the more limited expectation of privacy in cars as
opposed to homes, Justice Powell concluded that no individualized
suspicion at all was needed "at reasonably located checkpoints.""
Justice William Brennan wrote a heated dissent, in which Justice
Thurgood Marshall joined. Justice Brennan described the result as the
"defacement of Fourth Amendment protections," 3 declaring that
"[today's decision is the ninth this Term marking the continuing
evisceration of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures.""' What Justice Brennan objected to most was
the lack of any objective standard to evaluate the reasonableness of
the stop. Whereas in previous cases-Almeida-Sanchez v United
States,"' United States v Ortiz,"' and United States v Brignoni-Ponce" -

the Court had required some modicum of reasonableness,"' here the
Court abandoned the reasonableness standard completely:
We are told today [ ] that motorists without number may be
individually stopped, questioned, visually inspected, and then
further detained without even a showing of articulable suspicion,
let alone the heretofore constitutional minimum of reasonable
suspicion, a result that permits search and seizure to rest upon
"nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches.""9
On our view, naturally, there was a level of suspicion at the
roadblocks, and the only important question would have been
whether the hit rates at those checkpoints satisfied the minimum
threshold to be established by the Court.

110 Id at 560.
111 Id.

Id at 562.
Martinez-Fuerte,428US at 569 (Brennan dissenting).
114 Id at 567.
115 413 US 266 (1972).
116 422 US 891 (1974).
117 422 US 873 (1975).
118 See Almeida-Sanchez, 413 US at 273-74; Ortiz, 422 US at 897-98; Brignoni-Ponce,
422 US at 878.
119 Martinez-Fuerte,428US at 569-70 (Brennan dissenting), quoting Terry, 392 US at 22.
112

113
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3. Other contexts.
In addition, the Court has upheld a number of suspicionless
search programs outside the criminal context, such as inspections of
commercial establishments" and searches in correctional facilities.'
There are other cases, however, in which, drawing on the very same
logic and rationale, the Court has struck down suspicionless search
programs. An example is Chandler v Miller,'" where the Court
reviewed the state of Georgia's legal requirement that any candidate
for state office pass a drug test.'2 The Chandler Court held that the
drug-testing program did not respond to a "concrete danger," that
there was no evidence of a particular drug problem, and that state
office holders were not engaged in tasks that carried high risks or
safety hazards for third parties.24 In other words, there was no special
need or compelling state interest and no good reason to infringe on
privacy interests.
The upshot of this line of cases is that suspicionless searches
ought to be strictly curtailed to all but the most "exigen[t]"
circumstances, "after balancing the invasion of privacy against the
government's strong need."12 ' The Court's construction of the Fourth
Amendment is that "individualized suspicion" should reign in the core
criminal context of traditional policing, but that exceptions can be
made outside that core context where the requirement of suspicion
would render the program ineffectual and where there is both an
important state interest and a limited infringement of privacy.
But in all of these cases, the debate has been about suspicionbased versus suspicionless searches-and in that sense, they are all
orthogonal to our argument.' We are not arguing for suspicionless
120 See New York v Burger,482 US 691,702 (1987) (upholding as constitutional a New York
statute allowing warrantless investigations of vehicles in privately owned junkyards because
junkyards fit within the "closely regulated industry" exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement).
121 See Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520,557 (1979).
122 520 US 305 (1997).
123 See id at 309-10.
124 See id at 321-22.
125 Vernonia,515 US at 673 (O'Connor dissenting). See also Skinner,489 US at 624.
126 See Vernonia, 515 US at 673-74 (O'Connor dissenting).
127 There is, however, something very interesting about Vernonia. It turns out, actually, that
there may have been a suspicion basis to the random drug-testing program. The evidence of drug
use from the school suggested (not only to the school authorities, but also to Justice Scalia) that
the student athletes had a higher probability of using drugs-that the student athletes were, as a
group, in a class of more likely drug abusers. As the lower court found, and Justice Scalia noted,
"athletes were the leaders of the drug culture." Id at 649. And it was this group that was singled
out for random searches; as Justice Scalia emphasized, "The Policy applies to all students
participating in interscholastic athletics." Id at 650. So, even though the Court and the parties
considered the program "suspicionless," there is reason to believe that there was, in fact,
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searches. To the contrary, we are demanding that a level of suspicion
be established as a precondition to the constitutionality of the search.
We are setting the level of suspicion as the baseline. If anything, we
are demanding more than the Court does in the traditional crimerelated policing context. We are asking that the actual level of
suspicion be articulated on a probability scale and that all search
programs be evaluated against that chosen level.
Our challenge, then, is not to "individualized suspicion" as
opposed to suspicionless searches. We are all for suspicion. Our
trouble is instead with the idea of "individualized suspicion," which,
we believe, is a misguided add-on to the notion of suspicion.
B.

The Birth of "Individualized Suspicion"

The term "individualized suspicion" is itself of recent vintage. The
linguistic history of the term's usage suggests that it was born in the
1970s and has been used increasingly at both the state and federal
levels."' As both state and federal courts have become increasingly
invested in developing a jurisprudence of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness outside what we call the Warrant Model, use of the
term "individualized suspicion," as well as other synonyms, such as
"particularized suspicion," has proceeded apace.
In effect, the term "individualized suspicion" has become today a
placeholder for the conclusion that a search is "reasonable"-or for
that matter, that there is "probable cause" or "articulable suspicion."
When courts find (or do not find) "individualized suspicion," they are
in fact merely using a substitute term for the idea of probable cause, a
term that itself was never properly defined.' The evidence
surrounding the usage of the term "individualized suspicion" is
entirely consistent with this.
The term "individualized suspicion" dates from the mid-1970s.
One of the earliest uses of the term was, in fact, in the Martinez-Fuerte
decision in 1976.3o Usage of the term has mushroomed over the past
few decades in both federal and state courts. The term actually
emerged hand in hand with two others- "particularized suspicion""'
and "unparticularized suspicion"-the latter term appearing first in
suspicion underlying the targeting of the school athletes Depending on the level of suspicion,
then, it could have been reasonable, in our view, to use a targeted random testing program.
128 For more on the development of the term in Supreme Court jurisprudence, see Clancy,
25 U Memphis L Rev at 531-85 (cited in note 95).
129 See, for example, Ornelas v United States, 517 US 690, 695 (1996). But see Brinegarv
United States,338 US 160,175-76 (1949), quoting Carroll,267 US at 162.
130 See 428 US at 560.
131 See, for example, id at 564 n 18; People v Hyde, 524 P2d 830,835 (Cal 1974).
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Terry v Ohio.'32 It is revealing to look at the historical use of all three
sets of terms.
The following graphs reflect the usage of the term in judicial
decisions. The data were obtained using the LEXIS database. The first
graph reflects usage of the term "individualized suspicion" in federal
court cases; the second, in state court cases.
TABLE 6. NUMBER OF FEDERAL CASES USING THE TERM
"INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION"
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Notice that there is a slight lag from the federal cases to the state
cases, which reflects, naturally, that the term originated in the federal
appellate courts." The following graph is the combined state and
federal cases using the term "individualized suspicion," and it reflects
a relatively consistent upward trend, with 164 uses of the term in 2006
and 162 in 2007.
TABLE 8. COMBINED STATE AND FEDERAL CASES
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The pattern illustrated in the graphs is entirely consistent with the
idea that the new term emerged in the 1970s and then took off as a
way to render more concrete a notion of reasonable or articulable
suspicion that-just like probable cause-was never specifically
defined in probabilistic terms. ' The term "individualized suspicion"
was intended to carry some substantive meaning, but no courts has
attempted that task. Instead, the term is a mere rhetorical trope: it is a
conclusory statement that says nothing more than that the search was
found to be reasonable.
This state of affairs also appears to be true for a related term,
"particularized suspicion."

133 See, for example, Martinez-Fuerte,428 US at 560; State v McLaughlin, 471 NE2d 1125,
1141 (Ind App 1984), citing Delaware v Prouse,440 US 648,654-55 (1979).
134 Consider Alabama v White, 496 US 325, 329-30 (1990), quoting INS v Delgado,
466 US 210,217 (1983).
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TABLE 9. NUMBER OF FEDERAL CASES USING THE TERM
"PARTICULARIZED SUSPICION"
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TABLE 10. NUMBER OF STATE CASES USING THE TERM
"PARTICULARIZED SUSPICION"
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Again, the combined data for federal and state uses of
"particularized suspicion" show a relatively consistent increase, with a
slight dip in the final year of the data (2007), but no indication of a
significant shift in usage.
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TABLE 11. COMBINED STATE AND FEDERAL CASES
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Our argument is not that courts are being intentionally
obscurantist. Instead, by looking at the empirical trajectory of the
term, we simply mean to highlight the linguistic history and suggest
that it is entirely consistent with our claim that the term
"individualized suspicion" has become, today, a placeholder for the
conclusion that a search is "reasonable" -or for that matter, that there
is "probable cause" or "articulable suspicion."
C. The Term "Individualized Suspicion" Is Misguided
City of Indianapolis v Edmond, a case in which the Seventh

Circuit and later the Supreme Court were called upon to decide the
constitutionality of police roadblocks intended to detect drug
contraband,"' illustrates well the dynamic we are attempting to
describe. A little background about the case first.
On six occasions between August and November 1998, the
Indianapolis Police Department set up roadblocks on certain city
streets to catch drug offenders. The locations of these roadblocks were
determined weeks in advance based on information regarding area
crime statistics and traffic flow. The roadblocks were conducted during
the daytime and were identified with signs that read: "NARCOTICS
CHECKPOINT _ MILE AHEAD, NARCOTICS K-9 IN USE, BE
PREPARED TO STOP."'3 6 At each site, approximately thirty police
officers were present, and they would stop a predetermined number of
135

136

See Edmond v Goldsmith, 183 F3d 659,665-66 (7th Cir 1999), affd, Edmond,531 US at 36.
Edmond, 531 US at 34-36.
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vehicles. A group of vehicles would be diverted to the search area, and
the other traffic would then be allowed to go through until the police
had finished processing the group of stopped vehicles.' As a result,
the searches were randomized at the checkpoint.
During each stop, a police officer would approach the driver and
request his or her driver's license and car registration. The stopped
cars and their passengers would then be subject to a plain view search
of the interior through the car windows and a dog-sniffing search of
the exterior of the automobiles. According to the police, the entire
process was designed not to exceed five minutes.' Over the course of
the 6 roadblocks, 1,161 vehicles were stopped. The stops produced 55
drug-related arrests and 49 non-drug-related arrests (for offenses such
as driving with an expired driver's license), resulting in a 4.74 percent
drug-arrest hit rate and an overall hit rate of 8.96 percent"
The roadblocks, it seemed, had everything going for them: they
distributed the costs of enforcement evenly across motorists,
interfered as minimally as possible with the motorists' movement,
invaded motorists' privacy interests only slightly, and, according to
everyone on the Seventh Circuit panel at least, produced very "high"
rates of successful searches.' They were also randomly administered,
which means that police officers could not individually discriminate141
against African American drivers -or at least could not easily do so.
Despite this, Judge Richard Posner reversed the federal district
court-which had not enjoined the police practice-and put a stop to
the roadblocks, resting the decision on the arguable notion that the
police did not have any "individualized suspicion" to stop and
question any motorist.'42 Judge Posner, like most commentators, sought
"individualized suspicion" and found none. Judge Posner wrote,
"[Hlere the roadblock is meant to intercept a completely random
sample of drivers; there is neither probable cause nor articulable
suspicion to stop any given driver."14
With respect to both statements, Judge Posner was formally
correct. It is critical to see, however, that in the context of the
checkpoint the second statement regarding probable cause and
articulable suspicion was, in truth, inaccurate: for each driver, there
was a 4.74 percent chance that he was carrying drugs. We know this
1

137 See id at 35-36.
138 See id.
139 See Edmond, 183 F3d at 661.
140 See id at 662. See also id at 666 (Easterbook dissenting).
141 See id at 663 (majority).
142 See id at 665-66.
143 Edmond, 183 F3d at 663.
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after the fact, but we know it nonetheless. For each and every one of
those automobile travelers, there was "individualized suspicion" of
4.74 percent. That is a very specific and articulable level of suspicion.
Whether it is reasonable suspicion depends entirely on whether that
level-4.74 percent- satisfies the quantum required by the Fourth
Amendment. But that inquiry does not depend on whether the
suspicion is "individualized" or not. It does depend on whether Judge
Posner (or courts generally) thinks that 4.74 percent is a high enough
probability that crime is "afoot"'" to justify interfering in an
individual's autonomy and privacy interests.
In truth, then, there was a level of suspicion that attached to all
drivers. This notion of a quantum of suspicion is no different than in
the classic case of witness identification. So, for instance, if a victim
testifies that the perpetrator was a University of Chicago graduate
student who wore Converse high-tops, and there are, say, five hundred
graduate students at the University of Chicago who wore Converse
high-tops out of a student body of ten thousand, then we can easily
conclude that our "individualized suspicion" to question U of C grad
students who wore Converse high-tops reaches 5 percent. We can
quantify and establish before questioning the exact level of
"individualized suspicion" that we require and determine whether it
meets some minimum threshold to justify detaining and questioning
any of those graduate students.
The only difference between these two cases is a temporal one: we
do not know the level of individualized suspicion in the roadblock case
until after we have begun to conduct stops and perform visual and
canine searches at the roadblocks. (Though here, since this involves a
random sample of motorists, we can be pretty confident that we would
have similar levels of suspicion at similarly selected sites in the near
future. We could also obtain this information through research or
surveys.) In the second case, we know the level of suspicion ex ante
from the witness identification and other information and can use that
to assess whether there is sufficient justification to stop and question
individuals. In both cases, though, we can pretty easily determine the
level of suspicion-the actual level of "individualized suspicion."
In other words, there was "individualized suspicion" in Edmond.
Judge Posner could have found "individualized suspicion" at the level
of 4.74 percent. What he meant to say, of course, is that there was not
enough suspicion, but here, too, he could easily have found that there
was. The courts have never established a percentage requirement for
144 Terry, 392 US at 30 (holding that a reasonable belief that "criminal activity may be afoot,"
in conjunction with other factors, may legitimize a search of an individual's clothing for weapons).
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individualized suspicion or probable cause, and as now-Chief Judge
Frank Easterbrook noted in dissent, individualized suspicion has been
found at far less than 4.74 percent.145
Again, what matters is the quantum of suspicion. Was there
enough in Edmond? That would be the only proper question to ask in
order to assess the reasonableness of the searches. The answer, though,
is not so clear. These hit rates were perceived by the Seventh Circuit
as successful in detecting illicit drug and other criminal violations.
Judge Posner repeatedly referred to these hit rates as "high" and
added that they are "vastly higher than, for example, the probability of
a hit as a result of the screening of embarking passengers and their
luggage at airports.".'. Judge Easterbrook, in dissent, similarly referred
to the program in glowing terms: "The program is spectacularly
successful as roadblocks go; 9.4% of those stopped are arrested, with
the reason equally divided between driving and drug crimes."... Citing
the Martinez-FuerteBorder Patrol case and the Michigan Department
of State Police v Sitz"" sobriety checkpoint case-cases that involved
hit rates of 0.12 and 1.6 percent respectively-Judge Easterbrook
noted that "[r]oadblocks with much lower rates of success have been
held consistent with the fourth amendment."49
As a purely factual matter, though, the 4.74 percent drug hit rate or, for that matter, the 8.96 percent overall hit rate including minor
traffic violations' -is not really "spectacular," as Judge Easterbrook
suggested."' Hit rates from other law enforcement interventions have
been far greater. For example, the Maryland State Police between
January 1995 and January 1999 achieved drug contraband hit rates
along Maryland's 1-95 corridor of 32 percent with regard to white
drivers and 34 percent with regard to African American drivers." In
Missouri for the year 2001, police traffic stops achieved drug hit rates 145 Edmond, 183 F3d at 669-70 (Easterbrook dissenting) (comparing the hit rate in
Edmond with the less than 0.00001 percent hit rate in airport security and the less than 1 percent
hit rate in Martinez-Fuerte).
146 Id at 662,666 (majority).
147 Id at 666 (Easterbrook dissenting). We are not sure how Judge Easterbrook got to the
9.4 percent figure. Both Justice O'Connor and Judge Posner report similar search success rates of
104 motorists of a total pool of 1,161, or 8.96 percent. See Edmond, 531 US at 35; Edmond,
183 F3d at 661.
148 496 US 444 (1990).
149 Edmond, 183 F3d at 666 (Easterbrook dissenting), citing Martinez-Fuerte,428US at 554;
Sitz, 496 US at 448.
150 See Edmond, 183 F3d at 661.
1st Id at 666 (Easterbrook dissenting) (suggesting that the hit rate is "spectacularly successful").
152 See John Knowles, Nicola Perisco, and Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle
Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J Polit Econ 203, 222 (2001). But see Bernard E. Harcourt,
Rethinking Racial Profiling:A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional
Literature,and of CriminalProfidingMore Generally,71 U Chi L Rev 1275,1292 (2004).
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that is drugs only, not including faulty drivers' licenses-of 19.1, 12.3,
and 8.6 percent respectively for whites, African Americans, and
Hispanics.'53 A 1982 Department of Justice study of airport searches
using a drug-courier profile reported forty-nine successful searches
based on ninety-six total searches, for a hit rate of 51.04 percent. a A
government report analyzing New York City stops and frisks, prepared
in 1999, revealed average hit rates (stop-to-arrest ratios) of
approximately 13.7 percent in situations found to present reasonable
suspicion.' In the abstract, devoid of any comparative evidence about
search success rates in other contexts, the 4.74 percent drug hit rate may
well seem "high" or even "spectacularly successful"; however that may
be an artifact of judicial decisionmaking with no data, a perennial
problem in constitutional criminal procedure.'
Ultimately, courts should have to decide whether a 4.74 percent
probability of success is sufficient to satisfy the Constitution. But the
decision turns on the quantum of evidence, not on whether it is
"individualized" or not. If anything, the "individualized suspicion"
construct prevents courts from conducting the right inquiry.
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted, and as the plain
text of the Constitution suggests, "[T]he ultimate measure of the
constitutionality of a governmental search is 'reasonableness."" Our
argument in no way casts doubt on that principle. It relies on it
heavily. Our point is that the reasonableness of a governmental search
does not turn on "individualized suspicion" but on whether it meets a
certain level of suspicion.

153 See Rub6n Hernhndez-Murillo and John Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist Policing?
Bounds Tests in Aggregate Data,45 Intl Econ Rev 959,970 table 1 (2004).
154 See Harcourt,Against Prediction at 16 (cited in note 16), citing John Monahan and Laurens
Walker, eds, Social Science in Law: Cases and Materials 452-53 (Foundation 2006), citing Edwin
Zedlewski, The DEA Airport Surveillance Program:AnAnalysis ofAgentActivities (1984).
155 See Tracey L. Meares and Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword:TransparentAdjudication and
Social Science Research in ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure,90 J Crim L & Criminol 733,789
(2000), citing Civil Rights Bureau, Office of the Attorney General, The New York City Police
Department's "Stop & Frisk" Practices:A Report to the People of the State of New York from the
Office of the Attorney General 135 (Dec 1, 1999) ("Stop & Frisk Report"), online at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/bureaus/civil-rights/pdfs/stp-frsk.pdf (visited Apr 17,2011).
156 For an argument proposing increased use of social science evidence in constitutional
criminal procedure, see Meares and Harcourt, 90 J Crim L & Criminol at 746 (cited in note 155).
157 Vernonia, 515 US at 652. See also Carroll,267 US at 147 ("The Fourth Amendment does
not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are unreasonable.") and all of the cases
citing back to that famous statement. See Tracey Maclin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine
Learn from Vagueness Doctrine?, 3 U Pa J Const L 398,445 (2001).
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III. AN ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCT: RANDOMIZATION
Our argument so far is that the term "individualized suspicion" is
largely empty and that the courts have not used it to provide police
with anything close to concrete guidance in assessing their practices. It
is, instead, a rhetorical placeholder used to bless police practices
without providing policing agencies with any guidance or
requirements for structuring decisionmaking in a way that limits and
shapes discretion. It offers simply no direction to policing and other
law enforcement agencies to develop practices that appropriately
constrain discretion.
A. The Checkpoint as Lodestar
In this section, we suggest a construct that constrains discretion:
the checkpoint. Checkpoints, or roadblocks, look very different from
the world of policing envisioned by the individualized suspicion
paradigm. The individualized suspicion paradigm imagines an officer,
possibly roving, making judgments on the street about the suspicious
nature of the activities, apparel, and appearance of individuals in a
particular geographic area in light of that officer's training and
experience. When the officer stops or arrests someone, the Fourth
Amendment question is whether the officer can tell a story that is
sufficiently compelling to the decisionmaker so that he or she will
conclude that there was "individualized suspicion" for the police
action."s The randomization paradigm is entirely different: in this
model, there is a fixed roadblock established on the basis of a prior
plan that has been approved by those who supervise the officers who
will actually be conducting the searches. The reason for establishing
the checkpoint already has been approved by superiors in advance.
Critically, checkpoints are constitutional only when every car is
stopped unless a randomized stopping plan is adopted, as was the case
in Edmond,"' and the resulting hit rate meets a certain level of
suspicion.
These last points, we contend, are the most important differences
between the two models. Stops based on "individualized suspicion"
attempt justification through the establishment of good reasons for
interference, while checkpoint stops are justified primarily because there
are no reasons for such actions beyond the justification for the
checkpoint itself Once the base level of suspicion has been satisfied, the

158
1

See text accompanying notes 4-14.
See notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
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stops are no longer justified by subjective beliefs, hunches, and prejudices
about greater suspicion, but rather on the basis of evenhandedness.
Although this may, at first glance, seem to disregard
constitutional norms, it is precisely what promotes the core
constitutional values in the Fourth Amendment context. Take a
moment to consider a key danger of the "individualized suspicion"
regime-namely, the cost of being incorrectly targeted for police
intervention. In a world in which the police must have good reasons
for interfering with a person's autonomy, the stakes of incorrect
decisions are far higher. In the current constitutional regime, what
makes a decision by a police officer a good one is whether we believe
that officer has correctly (or correctly enough) identified or targeted a
potential offender. As Sherry Colb elegantly explains, this targeting
harm is a cost to individuals, in addition to the distinct costs of
autonomy invasion and of privacy curtailment. When police get it
right, we do not care very much about the targeting costs. But when
they get it wrong, those costs become a great concern not only to the
individual but also to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.
And the fact is, the police stop and arrest many, many more people
than are ultimately charged or convicted of crimes.m
In contrast to "individual suspicion" stops, random checkpoint
stops are not justified with reference to good reasons, but because of
randomization.Police are not required to have a good reason to stop a
person at a checkpoint once there is a justification for that checkpoint
procedure. It is enough that the person stopped is the third or fifth or
thirteenth in line-or that the person is in the queue if every car is
stopped. Importantly, while there may be no good reason for any
particular car to be stopped, it should be clear that there is a complete
absence of bad reasons. This is so because a randomization program
effectively precludes officers from exercising any discretion to stop
individual cars. Indeed, if an officer does exercise discretion, then that
officer's actions makes the checkpoint unconstitutional. And note that
since we can be confident that police officers operating a checkpoint
cannot exercise their discretion to make bad decisions, there is no
targeting harm from a checkpoint-based stop for any individual.
The effect on the targeted population is likely to be immense. To
see this, consider two different types of search paradigms, the Sitz

160 See Sherry E Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence,96 Colum L Rev 1456,1464,1485-1502 (1996).
161 See, for example, Stop & Frisk Report at 111 (cited in note 155) (noting a 9-to-1 ratio of
stops-to-arrests in a comprehensive review of a fifteen-month survey of traffic stops in New York
City). See also Part ILI.B.
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FIGURE 3. SITZ CURVE
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In the typical checkpoint, the median person stopped is likely to
be the median population member. Also, note that the bulk of people
stopped are likely to cluster around the median. By contrast, if one
were to draw a distributional curve of the group of people stopped
under the regime approved in Whren, it would look like Figure 4.
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Here the tail on the left side of the curve reflects that the median
person stopped is poorer, less educated, and more likely to be black
than his counterpart on the Sitz Curve.
As a result, the two regimes impose potential costs with respect
to targeting harms in predictable and troubling patterns. One way of
understanding the central claim of the defendant in Whren is that the
police use of traffic violations as probable cause to justify the
investigation of other suspected offenses (such as drug offenses)
imposes the costs of law enforcement on a group that is
demographically aggregated in a predictable way.16 The costs are even
higher when the aggregation occurs at the intersection of demography
and geography. This aggregation phenomenon helps to "race" crime in
a particular way.
B. Evidence of Racing Crime
The best available evidence suggests that this racing effect is a
real problem today. The data and analyses on police stops consistently
reveal disproportionate stops of African Americans and Hispanics.
The evidence is overwhelming.
In 2007, the RAND Corporation issued a report on the racial
disparities in the stop, question, and frisk practices of the NYPD.
Using data on all street encounters between NYPD officers and
pedestrians in 2006, RAND found that, although consistent estimates
could not be obtained on any racial disparities in stop rates (due to
the data's sensitivity to the type of benchmark used to compare the
disparaties), officers frisked whites less often than they frisked
similarly situated nonwhites (29 percent of stops, compared to
33 percent of stops). Search rates were roughly the same across races,
at 6 percent to 7 percent (although the study notes that in Staten
Island, the search rates of minorities was "significantly greater");
officers successfully recovered contraband less often from minorities
than similarly situated whites. Specifically, the success rate for blacks
was 5.7 percent, 5.4 percent for Hispanics, and 6.4 percent for whites.
The data and analysis confirmed Jeff Fagan's and Andrew
Gelman's earlier studies of NYPD stops. They analyzed 125,000
pedestrian stops by the NYPD from January 1998 to March 1999 and
See id at 810.
Consider David R. James, The Racial Ghetto as a Race-Making Situation: The Effects of
Residential Segregation on Racial Inequalities and Racial Identity, 19 Law & Soc Inquiry 407,
420-29 (1994); Jeffrey Fagan and Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control:
The Paradoxof Punishmentin Minority Communities,6 Ohio St J Crim L 173,220-21 (2008).
165 See Greg Ridgeway, Analysis of Racial Disparitiesin the New York Police Department's
Stop, Question and FriskPracticesxi-xiv (RAND 2007).
163
16
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nevertheless found that African Americans and Hispanics were stopped
more frequently than whites, "even after controlling for precinct
variability and race-specific estimates of crime participation."'6
In fact, study after study reveals discrimination. In August 2008,
Ian Ayres published a study on police stops by the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD).'67 Ayres analyzed data obtained from over
810,000 "field data reports" collected by the LAPD from July 1, 2003,
to June 30, 2004 (field data reports are completed whenever a police
officer makes a pedestrian or motor vehicle stop). Ayres found that
there were more than 4,500 stops per 10,000 African American
residents, whereas there were only 1,750 stops per 10,000 white
residents.'" In two divisions, Central and Hollywood, Ayres actually
found that "there were more stops of African Americans in one year
than there were African American residents, meaning that the average
number of stops per resident was greater than one."6 1
Ayres controlled his findings for variables such as the rate of
violent and property crime and found that the disparity was not the
result of different crime rates in different areas-"the stop rate per
10,000 residents was 3,400 stops higher" for blacks than whites, "and
7
Once
1
more than 350 stops higher for Hispanics" than whites.o
than
arrested
get
to
likely
more
29
percent
stopped, blacks were
were
Police
whites, and Hispanics were 32 percent more likely.
127 percent more likely to frisk or pat down stopped blacks than
7
stopped whites, and 43 percent more likely to do so for Hispanics. 1
While minorities were more likely to be stopped and then searched
once stopped, the results of these searches were less productive than
comparable searches with white residents. Searched blacks were
37 percent less likely to be found with weapons than searched whites,
24 percent less likely to be found with drugs, and 25 percent less likely
to be found with other contraband. Similarly, searched Hispanics were
33 percent less likely to be found with weapons, 34 percent less likely
to be found with drugs, and 12 percent less likely to be found with
other contraband.17 The race of the stopping officer also mattered166 Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan, and Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the NYPD's Stop-and-Frisk
Policy in the Context of Claims of RacialBias *9,13,15 (unpublished manuscript, Dec 2005), online
at http://www.stat.columbia.edul-gelman/researchlunpublished/frisk7.pdf (visited June 10,2011).
167 See generally Ian Ayres and Jonathan Borowsky, A Study of Racially Disparate
Outcomes in the Los Angeles Police Department (ACLU 2008), online at http://www.aclusc.org/documents/view/47 (visited Apr 17,2011).
168 See id at 1, 5-8.
169 Id at 5-6.
170 Id.
171 See Ayres and Borowsky, Study of Racially DisparateOutcomes at 6 (cited in note 167).
172 Id at 7-8.
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the disparities found decreased when the officer was of the same race
as the person who was stopped."3
A few months earlier, in April 2008, the ACLU of Arizona
released a study analyzing the first full year of data on highway traffic
stops collected under a settlement agreement with the Arizona
Department of Public Safety (the period spanned July 1, 2006, to June
30, 2007).' The analysis revealed that patrol officers searched African
Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans at a higher rate than
whites or other minorities; blacks and Hispanics who were stopped by
police were searched 10 percent of the time and Native Americans
13 percent of the time. By contrast, whites, Asians, and Middle
Easterners were searched around 3 to 5 percent of the time."' The
study found no evidence to support such differential treatment by
race-on average, 34 percent of whites searched were found with
contraband, while only 22 percent of Hispanics searched were found
with contraband. Blacks were found with contraband at similar rates
as whites (38 percent) but were twice as likely to be searched."6
In a follow-up study commissioned by the Arizona Department of
Public Safety using an additional six months of data, the researchers
found that, conditional on being stopped, racial disparities existed in the
outcome of the stop, even after controlling for other explanatory
factors."' Whites were more likely to receive warnings (44.6 percent of
stops) than blacks (41.3 percent of stops) and Hispanics (only
33.6 percent of stops). By contrast, Hispanics and blacks were more
likely to be cited than whites (48.9 percent for Hispanics, 48.1 percent
for blacks, and 43.4 percent for whites). Hispanics, blacks, and Native
Americans were all significantly more likely to get searched or arrested.
Whites were arrested only 2.1 percent of the time, while Native
Americans were arrested 5.4 percent of the time, blacks 4.2 percent of
the time, and Hispanics 3.9 percent of the time. Hispanics were searched
at an 8.6 percent rate, blacks at 7.5 percent, Native Americans at
6.9 percent, and whites at 3.3 percent. All results were statistically

Id at 7.
See ACLU of Arizona, Driving While Black or Brown:An Analysis of Racial Profilingin
Arizona 2 (2008), online at http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/DrivingWhile
BlackorBrown.pdf (visited Apr 17,2011).
175 Id at 6 table 2.
176 See id at 10 table 4. See also id at 6 table 2.
177 See Robin S. Engel, Jennifer Calnon Cherkauskas, and Michael R. Smith, Traffic Stop
Data Analysis Study: Year 2 Final Report 126-29 (University of Cincinnati Policing Institute
2008), online at http://www.azdps.gov/about/Reports/docs/FrafficStop.DataReport_2008.pdf
(visited Apr 17, 2011). The study was commissioned by the law enforcement agency, and it
emphasized that "no department-wide conclusions" could be made on any racial disparities in
stopping behavior. Id at 125.
173
174
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significant at the 0.001 level."' Analysis of the percentage of searches
that successfully found contraband showed that for nonconsent
discretionary searches, searches of Hispanics had the lowest success
rates (37.5 percent); in comparison, the success rates were 52.9 percent
for Native Americans, 50.4 percent for whites, 50.0 percent for blacks,
and 46.4 percent for other races."'
In February 2009, West Virginia issued its "Traffic Stop Study" final
report for 2008." The state found that, on average, blacks were
1.64 times more likely to be stopped by police than whites, and
Hispanics were 1.48 times more likely to be stopped than whites. Blacks
and Hispanics were also more likely to be searched than whites, with
the rates of being searched at 10.64 percent for blacks, 10.24 percent for
Hispanics, and 4.32 percent for whites. While the rates of being stopped
and searched were higher for minorities, the contraband "hit rates" (the
rate at which contraband is found in a search) were lower. The hit rate
for blacks was 43.11 percent, 30.23 percent for Hispanics, and
47.17 percent for whites. Finally, the rates of receiving a citation or
getting arrested were higher for blacks (57.34 percent) and Hispanics
(60.92 percent) than for white drivers (46.52 percent).' Similar results
were found on data at the county and agency level.18
In 2009, Alexander Weiss and Dennis P. Rosenbaum of the
University of Illinois at Chicago Center for Research in Law and
Justice issued the 2008 annual report on traffic stops for the state of
Illinois -the fifth annual traffic stop report required under state law
due to allegations of racial profiling.' Weiss and Rosenbaum found
that minority drivers were around 13 percent more likely to get
stopped than white drivers.' Once stopped, minorities were around
10 percent more likely to receive a citation. Specifically, 64 percent of
blacks were cited, 69 percent of Hispanics, 65 percent of Asians, and
70 percent of Native Americans, compared to 58 percent of whites. In
terms of searches, Hispanic drivers were 2.4 times more likely to be
subjected to a consented search than white drivers, and black drivers
Id at 53-54.
Id at 103-04 & figure 5.8.
180 See generally Stephen M. Haas, Erica Turley, and Monika Sterling, West Virginia Traffic
Stop Study: FinalReport (West Virginia Division of Criminal Justice Services 2009), online at http://
www.dcjs.wv.gov/SACIDocuments/NEWOverviewofStatewideFmdings2009.pdf
(visited Apr 17,
2011).
181 Id at 9.
182 Id at i-iii.
183 See Alexander Weiss and Dennis P. Rosenbaum, Illinois Traffic Stops Statistics Study
2008 Annual Report 2 (University of Illinois at Chicago Center for Research in Law and Justice
2009), online at http://www.dot.state.il.us/travelstats/ITSS%202008%2OAnnual%20Report.pdf
(visited Apr 17,2011).
184 See id at 5-6 & figure 2.
178

179
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3 times more likely." While minorities were about 2.5 times more
likely to be searched than whites, they were less likely to be found
with contraband. Searches of white drivers turned up contraband
24.4 percent of the time, while searches of minorities did so only
15.1 percent of the time-in other words, police were searching
minorities more even though searches of whites found contraband 1.6
times more than searches of minorities.'"
These reports extend a long and consistent history of studies
documenting racial profiling in American policing across the country.
Earlier in 2007, for instance, the RAND Corporation had issued its
report on racial disparities in the stop, question, and frisk practices of
the NYPD.mn And a year earlier, in 2006, the Northeastern University
Institute on Race and Justice had issued a report on traffic stop
disparities in Rhode Island.' The study found that minorities were
subjected to searches at over twice the rate of whites (13.6 percent for
minorities, 6.3 percent for whites). Limiting the data to only
discretionary searches (searches not incident to a lawful arrest) still
found minorities being searched at twice the rate of whites, with
minorities being searched at 5.9 percent and whites being searched at
2.9 percent.' While minorities were searched at twice the rate of
whites, the productivity of searches was less for minorities than for
whites. For discretionary searches, whites had a 26.5 percent hit rate,
while minorities had a 22.3 percent hit rate.

More recently, on June 30, 2009, the ACLU released its report to
the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: The
Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States."' The
report catalogued the independent and ACLU-collected evidence of
racial profiling by twenty-two states and by the federal government,
describing in an intricate and detailed ninety-eight page report all of
the evidence for racial profiling by state and local law enforcement.
The report concluded that both data and anecdotal evidence revealed
that minorities in the United States are being subjected to racial

185 Id at 10-13 & figure 6.

Id at 12-13.
See Ridgeway,Analysis of Racial Disparitiesat xi-xiii (cited in note 165).
188 See Amy Farrell and Jack McDevitt, Rhode Island Traffic Stop Statistics Data Collection
Study 2004-2005 1-4 (Northeastern University Institute on Race and Justice, Apr 2006), online at
http://www.rijustice.ri.gov/documents/sac/Final%2OReport%202004-2005.pdf (visited Apr 17,2011).
189 Id at 67-71 tables 4.5 & 4.6.
186
187

190 Idat

78.

191 See generally ACLU and Rights Working Group, Persistence of Racial and Ethnic
Profiling in the United States:A Follow-Up Report to the UN. Committee on the Elimination of
at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/humanrights/cerd
online
Racial Discrimination (2009),
jinareport.pdf (visited Apr 17,2011).
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profiling in spite of the numerous public statements by state and
federal government officials that the practice of racial profiling should
end.'9 Anecdotal examples of racial profiling-such as the illegal
deportation of a cognitively impaired US citizen from Los Angeles
because officials did not believe he could possibly be a citizen,'" or
Detroit police officers accused of conducting bare-handed searches of
a number of young black males' genitals94-were supported by
analyses of state-level data from Minnesota to California finding
consistent patterns of racial minorities being overstopped,
oversearched, and overfrisked in comparison to whites.195
C.

Other Costs of "Individualized Suspicion"

There are additional differences between individual suspicionbased stops and checkpoints. If we define autonomy costs as the length
of detention and the magnitude of the inconvenience, the amount of
time and burden any one person spends in a checkpoint tends to be
shorter than the typical suspicion-based stop.'" The checkpoint also
limits discretion in another way-by enhancing the political
accountability of policing agencies to the people who are policed.
The primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to curtail,
constrain, and shape police discretion, and only randomization fullfils
that function. As Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate, the more likely it is that
the typical person who encounters the police in a checkpoint reflects
the median voter in a given community, the more likely it is that police
will be attentive to the demands of that voter when shaping and
developing policy. Combining discretion constraint with enhanced
accountability helps ensure that checkpoints satisfy Fourth
Amendment reasonableness.
The additive impact of these benefits will lead, we think, to fewer
illegitimate invasions of individual autonomy and privacy. Moreover,
we should expect law enforcement agencies to be more effective and
efficient. Even if the same number of people may be stopped as are
stopped today, they will be stopped for shorter periods of time and for
the purposes of enhancing more accurate targeting if and when
suspicion-based engagement is appropriate. Because the suspicionSee, for example, id at 12.
Id at 47-48.
Id at 56.
195 ACLU and Rights Working Group, Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the
United States at 41-68 (cited in note 191).
196 Compare Weiss and Rosenbaum, Illinois Traffic Stops Statistics at 9-10 & figure 5 (cited
in note 183), with Martinez-Fuerte,428 US at 547; Edmond v Goldsmith, 183 F3d 659, 661-62
(7th Cir 1999).
192
193
194
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based stops will be more accurate, fewer people will be wrongfully
stopped.
D. Ensuring Privacy Interests
Many may object that our approach does not adequately protect
the value of privacy at the heart of the Fourth Amendment. As Justice
O'Connor and others have repeatedly stated, "Protection of privacy,
not evenhandedness, was then and is now the touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment."" That objection, however, is mistaken.
Under our scheme, privacy is protected by requiring a certain
level of suspicion. What we propose is to have our cake and eat it, too:
to have privacy and evenhandedness. The two constitutional values
are neither mutually exclusive nor in a zero-sum contest.
We can illustrate the point by returning to the discussion of this issue
by Justice O'Connor in Vernonia, the public school randomized drugtesting case-precisely where she inveighs against evenhandedness.
Justice O'Connor discusses and embraces an analysis of the Fourth
Amendment centered on original intent. While examining the history of
searching both ships and vessels on the sea, Justice O'Connor notes that
it was most telling of all that
the particular way the Framers chose to curb the abuses of general
warrants-and by implication, all general searches-was not to
impose a novel "evenhandedness" requirement; it was to retain the
individualized suspicion requirement contained in the typical
general warrant, but to make that requirement meaningful and
enforceable, for instance, by raising the required level of
individualized suspicion to objective probable cause.
Justice O'Connor then turns to the example of the original
congressional authorization regarding duty collectors' searches of
possibly concealed goods subject to import duties. There, warrants
were required in the case of any search on land; however, for searches
at sea, warrants were dispensed with, but Congress nevertheless
"limited officials to searching only those ships and vessels 'in which [a

197 Vernonia, 515 US at 671 (O'Connor dissenting). See also New Jersey v TL.O., 469 US 325,
361 (1985) (Brennan dissenting); Camarav Municipal Court,387US 523,528 (1967); Jones v United
States, 357 US 493,498 (1958).
198 Vernonia, 515 US at 670 (O'Connor dissenting). It turns out that the history is more
contentious than Justice O'Connor maintains. See Fabio Arcila Jr, The Death of Suspicion,
51 Wm & Mary L Rev 1275, 1297-1326 (2010); Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into
ProbableCause,87 Tex L Rev 913,920-23,948-51 (2009).
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shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or

merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed.'

Justice O'Connor maintains that it is precisely this requirement
of suspicion that protected privacy. Justice O'Connor writes:
True, not all searches around the time the Fourth Amendment was
adopted required individualized suspicion-although most did. A
search incident to arrest was an obvious example of one that did
not, but even those searches shared the essential characteristics
that distinguish suspicion-based searches from abusive general
searches: they only "affec[t] one person at a time," and they are
generally avoidable by refraining from wrongdoing. Protection of
privacy, not evenhandedness, was then and is now the touchstone
of the Fourth Amendment.It is precisely the fact that there is suspicion that satisfies privacy
requirements.n' And evenhandedness is no substitute for the protection
of privacy, the Court has emphasized. Justice O'Connor writes:
The Court clearly indicated that evenhanded treatment was no
substitute for the individualized suspicion requirement: "It would
be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were
authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding
liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to
the inconvenience and indignity of such a search."...
We fully embrace this reasoning. We are not arguing for
evenhandedness as a substitute to suspicion, but as a complement to
privacy.
We are not asking for suspicionless randomized searches. On the
contrary, we want the level of suspicion spelled out. By ensuring a
minimum level of suspicion, we ensure the protection of privacy. Our
argument, in essence, is that the entire process of weighing
governmental interests against privacy interests is a charade and that
it can be replaced, very simply, by a determination of the threshold
level of probable culpability tied to a level of offense. And we believe
that this can be achieved in practice.

199 Vernonia,515 US at 671 (O'Connor dissenting), quoting Act of July 31,1789 §24,1 Stat 29,
43, repealed by Act of Aug 4,1790 §74,1 Stat 145,178.
200 Vernonia,515 US at 671 (O'Connor dissenting) (citation omitted).
201 But see Arcila,51 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1297-1310 (cited in note 198).
202 Vernonia,515 US at 668-69 (O'Connor dissenting), quoting Carroll,267 US at 153-54.
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E. Measuring Suspicion
As we have demonstrated elsewhere, it is in fact possible to
measure the level of suspicion associated with group traits and to assess
whether that level of suspicion satisfies a constitutional standardsassuming that the Supreme Court were to articulate such a standard in
in the context of the
probabilistic terms. Our earlier discussion was set
204
Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v Wardlow, where the Court was
asked to determine whether a police officer's stop of a suspect, after the
suspect fled upon seeing several police cruisers patrolling an area
known for heavy narcotics trafficking, violated the Fourth
Amendment. 2' The Court, in a 5-4 decision, decided that the stop was
constitutional and reversed the Illinois Supreme Court's decision to the
contrary.
The way we framed the case was to explore, empirically, whether
flight from the police is really a good indicator of guilt, and what we
attempted to show is that there actually was good evidence to guide
the resolution of that question. Neither the majority nor the dissent
looked to empirical evidence in Wardlow, choosing instead to answer
the question with reference to commonsense judgments.20 What we
tried to show, by contrast, was that the constitutional issue was
precisely the kind of question for which there may have been an
empirical answer.
In particular, we turned to a pathbreaking study of street stops in
New York City released on December 1, 1999-about six weeks before
Wardlow was published.20 The New York Office of the Attorney
General (OAG) study was an analysis of 175,000 forms collected over
15 months, as well as "census data, crime statistics, and demographic
9

information to yield ... a statistically valid, quantitative view of the

practice of 'stop and frisk."'

21

0

The New York OAG Report collected, in

See Meares and Harcourt, 90 J Crim L & Criminol at 789 (cited in note 155).
528 US 119 (2000).
205 See id at 121-22.
206 See id at 120, revg People v Wardlow, 701 NE2d 484,486 (1111998).
207 See Meares and Harcourt, 90 J Crim L & Criminol at 790-92 (cited in note 155).
208 See Wardlow, 528 US at 124; id at 128 (Stevens dissenting).
209 See Meares and Harcourt, 90 J Crim L & Criminol at 787-92 (cited in note 155)
(applying findings of the OAG report to the Wardlow case). Although the report was not issued
early enough for it to be included in the briefs in Wardlow, it was available to the justices when
they wrote the opinion. We explore the report here as an example of evidence that could be used
in making a reasonableness determination rather than condemning the court for overlooking the
report.
210 Stop & Frisk Report at 88 (cited in note 155). The forms that provide the fodder for this
analysis are known as "UF-250s." Id. According to the NYPD's Patrol Guide, a police officer
who stops and frisks an individual must complete a UF-250 if a person is (1) stopped by force;
(2) stopped and frisked or searched; (3) arrested; or (4) stopped and refuses to identify oneself.
203
204
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addition to racial breakdowns on stop-and-frisks, a measure of how
"good" those stops were: how many of the stops led to an arrest.
Citywide, that ratio was 9-to-1.2 H That is, nine stops were made by the
NYPD for every arrest. But the OAG Report contained more finegrained information. The study collected information on a sample of
stops" based on facts that, as reported by the police, clearly met the
constitutional standard of reasonable suspicion according to Terry and
its progeny.2' Additionally, the study relied upon information on stops
based on facts that courts have decided clearly do not constitute
reasonable suspicion.214 Moreover, the report collected information
pertinent to the very facts in Wardlow -suspects who flee from the
police in high-crime areas. The table on the following page summarizes
the OAG Report.
With respect to the particular issue presented in Wardlow, the
chart provides a fascinating picture of police work. Stops reported as
undertaken because the suspect fled the scene result in a high stop-toarrest ratio - a ratio of 26-to-1. That ratio is quite close to that of stops
based on factors generally understood to fail to satisfy reasonable
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. Note that even when flight in
a high-crime area is considered, the ratio between stops and arrests
lowers, but it does not lower by much. It stands at 20.3-to-1. (These
data support the Wardlow dissenters' argument that flight may be
caused by a whole host of reasons that are not indicative of criminal
. * 215
activity. )
Importantly, however, the Wardlow Court did not discuss merely
the suspicious nature of flight generally; rather, the Court assessed
whether flight "upon noticing the police"2 or "flight [that] was
motivated by the presence of a police officer" 21 1 was suspicious enough
to justify a police stop. The researchers who analyzed the data in the
See id at 89, citing Police Department City of New York, Patrol Guide: Procedure No. 116-33 *1
(Nov 14, 1986). In situations that fall outside these four contexts, a police officer may fill out a
form if he or she desires to do so. See Stop & Frisk Report at 90 (cited in note 155) (providing a
copy of the form). The pool of forms analyzed in the study contained about three-quarters
mandated reports and the rest voluntary. Id at 91. The forms covered stops that occurred in 1998
and the first three months of 1999. Id at v.
211 Stop & Frisk Report at 111 (cited in note 155).
212 For this portion of the analysis, a sample of 15,000 out of the database of 175,000 stops
was used. See id at 135.
213 Categories of stop rationales were developed, and then the UF-250 forms were coded in
accordance with these categories. See id at 135-38, 145. The researchers discussed with lawyers
for the OAG the constitutional standard to code, and a great deal of data was excluded for
insufficiency, as the summary table below indicates. See id at 145-58.
214 See id at 147.
215 See Wardlow,528 US at 128-33 (Stevens dissenting).
216 Id at 124 (majority).
217 Id at 130 (Stevens dissenting).
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New York OAG Report categorized this more specialized type of
flight in a category separate from the general flight category. The ratio
between stops and arrests with respect to flight to elude the police
suggests a tighter relationship than the general flight code. Indeed, the
15.8-to-1 ratio of stops to arrests for this category is quite close to the
ratio of the other categories of information for stops deemed
insufficient to determine constitutionality with confidence-an
indication that Wardlow is indeed the close case that it appears on first
impression to be. When the data on flight to elude police are confined
to high-crime areas-the very context presented by the facts in
Wardlow2 18 -a different relationship between stops and arrests
emerges. But not what one would expect! These data reveal a stop-toarrest ratio of 45-to-1.
TABLE 9. SUMMARY OF THE OAG REPORT

Facts articulate
reasonable suspicion
Facts do not articulate
reasonable suspicion
Insufficient
information
Flight Alone
Fleeing crime scene
Attempted flight

Total Stops

Stops Resulting
in Arrest

Ratio of Stops
to Arrest

2,678

368

7.3

673

23

29.3

1,032

76

13.6

104
79

4
5

26
15.8

61
45

3
1

20.3
45

4,383

467

Flight in High-Crime
Area
Fleeing crime scene
Attempted flight

Total

Source: Meares and Harcourt, 90 J Crim L & Criminol at 791 table 2 (cited in note 155).

9.4
219

This astoundingly high relationship between stops and arrests is
suggestive that in high-crime urban communities where the
population is disproportionately minority, flight from an identifiable
police officer is a very poor indicator that crime is afoot. But more
importantly, for our purposes here, the data suggest that it is possible
to measure the level of suspicion attaching to group-based categories.
The data in Table 9 provide a comparative measure of the
intrusiveness of police stops for different categories of reasons.
218 See id at 121 (majority).
219 We are grateful to Jeffrey Fagan, Center for Violence Research and Prevention,
Columbia University, for the analysis of stops and arrests based on the flight codes.
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The difficulty, of course, is that the Supreme Court has never used
exact proportions to explain the level of certainty a police officer must
possess under the reasonableness approach.no Our point is that this
deficiency can be cured.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND SOME OBJECTIONS

It is crucial to compare and evaluate different Fourth
Amendment approaches against the appropriate baseline. That
baseline is how police power is exercised today, not in some idealized
world. We need to compare our proposal to actual police practices, not
perfect or idealized possibilities. And while we may well agree that
checkpoints might be intolerable in an idealized world, that world is
not the one in which we live. The issue is whether the evenhandedness
of randomized policing may improve the current situation, and here
we believe that the answer is yes.

220 Rather than emphasizing a particular quantum of evidence necessary to justify a stop
under the reasonable suspicion standard, the Court has emphasized the factual basis for the stop
by requiring an officer to review all those factors that motivated him to act. See, for example,
Michigan v Summers, 452 US 692, 703 (1981); Wardlow, 528 US at 124. Despite the Court's
reluctance to discuss the level of certainty probabilistically, there is evidence that decisionmakers
assess the level of evidence that justifies different police actions in implicit probabilistic terms.
For example, in one study, 96 out of 166 federal judges surveyed indicated a belief that the
reasonable suspicion standard requires 40 percent certainty or less that evidence of crime would
be found by an officer after a stop. See C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof Degrees of Belief
Quanta of Evidence, or ConstitutionalGuarantees?,35 Vand L Rev 1293,1327 table 3 (1982). In
the same study, 25 percent of the judges indicated that 50 percent certainty was necessary for
reasonable suspicion, while another 19 percent indicated that 60 percent certainty or more was
necessary. Id at 1327-28. This empirical evidence makes it quite clear that Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence leaves open just how much liberty should be circumscribed. See Slobogin,
39 UCLA L Rev at 75-78 (cited in note 70).
221 We would also suggest that, for serious crime, the level of suspicion could be lower than
for trivial offenses or misdemeanors. If the offense is in fact trivial, perhaps we should augment
the level of suspicion, in part because the triviality of the offense in all likelihood suggests that
the general level of offending in society is probably higher. There is a sense in which we do that,
intuitively, in many criminal contexts. In the case of conspiracy, for example, we require a higher
level of evidence of intentionality to support a conspiracy or complicity charge. So, for example,
when an individual who provides telephone message service to the public is accused of
conspiring with prostitutes, we may require more evidence of intentional aiding in order to prove
a conspiracy. We may not be as willing to impute intent based on knowledge -based on the fact
that the telephone message provider simply knows that his customers include prostitutes.
However, we may be willing to impute intent if an individual is accused of facilitating a terrorist
act if, with knowledge, that individual sells a service that furthers the terrorist act. This is,
famously, the distinction drawn in People v Lauria, 59 Cal Rptr 628, 634-35 (Cal App 1967)
(requiring greater level of evidence of intent in conspiracy case involving prostitution). The same
type of distinction may apply in the Fourth Amendment context: we may require a higher
threshold of suspicion in the case of more ordinary misdemeanors or more trivial felonies.
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A. Models of Suspicion-Sufficient Randomized Policing
Before addressing some objections, though, let us be more precise
about the exact kind of policing that we are proposing. Here are five
examples of randomized police practices that we believe would satisfy
constitutional values and improve on current police practices by
promoting evenhandedness while ensuring the protection of
legitimate privacy interests.
1. Randomized consent searches on the highway.
Rather than allow the police to use profiles and hunches to seek
consent to search on the highway, highway patrol officers would be
instructed to seek consent to search vehicles in every third or fifth (or,
if they have the time, every) stop of a vehicle traveling at a designated
speed -for instance, ninety to ninety-five miles per hour on even days
and eighty-five to ninety miles per hour on odd days. The evidence
from traffic stops across the country suggests that, as the amount of
discretion in the stopping and searching decreases, the racial
2 This randomized
disproportionality of the stops also decreases.m
approach would protect privacy, since it is based on a traffic violation
(excessive speeding), and at the same time ensure evenhandedness.
2. Randomized evening street stop-and-frisks in diverse
socioeconomic neighborhoods.
Instead of allowing targeted stop-and-frisk activity in minority,
high-risk neighborhoods only, urban police officers would be instructed
to conduct evening stop-and-frisks in, say, five different neighborhoods
of diverse socioeconomic and demographic composition. In each
location, police officers would be asked to stake out a block or
intersection and then to stop, interview, and frisk each tenth (or fifth or
twentieth, depending on traffic) person who walks by them. Police
officers would hand each person searched a card with information
about the search program. If the search program did not net the
requisite level of suspicious activity (including drug contraband,
firearms, and so on), then all persons searched under the program
would be entitled to monetary compensation. As in all large
metropolitan areas today, police would fill out a contact card for each
stop-and-frisk encounter, which would make data collection very easy.

222

See State v Soto, 734 A2d 350,354 (NJ Super Ct 1999).
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3. Randomized subway and bus searches of bags and patdowns.
Here too, the idea would be to substitute a randomized program
for the type of more targeted anti-terrorism searches of bags in the
subway post-9/11.m Again, the police would be directed to locate
themselves in such a way as to diversify the populations that they
encounter. The searches would be conducted on a random basis (fifth,
tenth, or twentieth person entering the station or boarding the bus)
and would be accompanied by an information card in the event that
the search program does not meet the threshold requirement of
suspicion.
4. Randomized DUI roadblocks.
These would involve randomized administration of breathalyzer
tests at roadblocks located at various diverse neighborhoods in the
city or along roads in diverse rural areas. These, too, would be
monitored and evaluated on a monthly basis and subject to the
requirement that information be distributed for eventual
compensation if the level of DUI detection falls below the minimum
level of suspicion.
5. Randomized investigation of trades on any stock for which
there is an important disclosure of good or bad corporate news.
Here, federal investigators would randomly select and investigate
persons who bought or sold a quantity of shares in a company that,
within a certain period of the trade, announced significant news
affecting the stock price. The investigation could include, for example,
the power of subpoena for phone records.
These are just five examples, of course, and the list could go on,
for example, to include random IRS audits, immigration checks, or
even random computer scans for illegal downloads or child
pornography."

We suspect that you may be saying to yourself that these police
practices seem extreme and somewhat totalitarian. You may think that
people will view these practices are unfair and illiberal, even perhaps
un-American -that we have forgotten the lessons of the American
Revolution (or something to that effect). This outrage rests on an
223 See, for example, MacWade v Kelly, 460 F3d 260,263 (2d Cir 2006); Cassidy v Chertoff,
471 F3d 67,87 (2d Cir 2006). But see generally Ric Simmons, Searchingfor Terrorists:Why Public
Safety Is Not a SpecialNeed, 59 Duke L J 843 (2010).
224 See, for example, Sarah Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers,
41 Conn L Rev 161, 163-68 (2008); Daniel Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate,
75 U Chi L Rev 343,357 (2008).
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intuition: people who have not done anything wrong ought to be left
alone by the police. Our response may sound condescending, and for
that we apologize (especially to our readers who may have extensive
or other experience with police searches). But here we go anyway: the
reason that you may be having that response, very likely, is because
you may be part of an elite in the United States that is relatively
sheltered from police stop-and-frisks. But for most young men living
in the inner city, this is the American experience. Remember that in
2008 the NYPD stopped and frisked 531,159 individuals, and that
about 90 percent of those stops and frisks resulted in no arrest or
summons. That is half a million stop-and-frisks. Many of us have not
experienced those kinds of police practices, because many of us are
not the "usual suspects." But for many youth in poor urban
neighborhoods, being stopped and frisked is a common experience.
What we are proposing, in effect, is simply to distribute more
evenhandedly the burden of making us all safe and secure.
B.

Compensation Questions

There is, today, no system of compensation for wrongful searches,
and the existing mechanisms to police the Fourth Amendmentpredominantly 42 USC § 1983 civil rights suits-are inadequate to the
task.m
We propose compensation primarily because the level of
suspicion for randomized search programs often will be difficult to
ascertain ex ante, before the search program has been implemented.
Under these circumstances, we believe that persons who are subject to
randomized searches where there is ultimately an insufficient level of
suspicion should be compensated for their time and inconvenience. By
contrast, individuals who are inconvenienced at a proper checkpoint,
where there is ultimately sufficient suspicion, should view the
inconvenience as part of their civic obligations to ensure safety for all.
We also propose compensation in order to incentivize the police to
achieve the minimum level of suspicion that would be eventually set
by the Supreme Court.
Under our proposal, a police department would need only to
compensate individuals wrongfully searched (that is, not arrested or
fined) at a checkpoint if the overall level of suspicion at that
checkpoint did not reach the minimum constitutional level required.
In all cases where the randomized search program does achieve the
225 See William C. Heffernan and Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U Mich J L Ref 311,361
n 123 (1991).
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base level of successful searches, individuals at those checkpoints
would not be compensated. Moreover, as discussed further below,
individuals who are wrongfully searched outside the context of a
checkpoint would also automatically be entitled to compensation with
an additional penalty for their targeted harm.22
One might ask why we limit compensation simply to those who
are subject to search without an ex ante determination of suspicion if
it is subsequently determined that the search, as carried out, does not
meet the required level of suspicion. The answer is that the regime we
propose here is not a remedial one but rather simply an incentive
structure designed to address the fact that people will have their
autonomy and privacy interests infringed upon for no reason. As we
have argued here, we think it is within legitimate constitutional
interpretation for such search and seizures to occur without ex ante
determination of suspicion so long as the incursion is evenhanded.m It
may well be the case, however, that the Warrant Model of the Fourth
Amendment would also be enhanced by a compensation regime. We
take no position on that issue here.
Compensation is not without its problems. First, it may create
perverse incentives. It is possible, for instance, that some people will
be drawn to checkpoints in order to receive compensation, which
would effectively reduce the hit rate at the checkpoint and make
compensation even more likely. These incentives could be reduced,
however, by maintaining an element of surprise in the checkpoint.
Second, the compensation scheme may also make the entire policy
seem more unfair if compensation is being awarded in the higherincome neighborhoods (if there are, for instance, lower hit rates) and
not in the inner-city neighborhoods (if there are, correspondingly,
higher hit rates). This latter point would militate in favor of not
awarding compensation based on the hit rate and level of suspicion,
but instead to all persons who are wrongly searched. Third,
compensation may reduce the positive effects of policing, since it
represents a cost that will have to be internalized by the policing
budget. There will be costs associated with the compensation scheme,
including not only the compensation itself, but also administration,
notification, disputes over claims, and so on. If the costs are high, it
may reduce the number of people that can be searched, which will
further reduce the effects of policing-perhaps, the total level of
deterrence, incapacitation, or retribution. In other words, there will be
226 Advances in technology make the regime we describe here quite easy to imagine in real
life. Anyone who has used an E-ZPass has interacted with the kind of technology one could use
to facilitate easy payment. We thank Jeff Meyer for pointing us to this example.
227 See Parts III.A. and IID.
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costs associated with any such program that may take away from the
benefits.
These problems are by no means trivial. But they need to be
weighed against the important goal of ensuring evenhandedness in
our policing. The turn to randomization means that certain policing
programs will need to be implemented without ex ante knowledge of
the exact level of suspicion and that calls for compensation for those
who are burdened by those unsuccessful programs. We believe that
some of the administrative costs will be absorbed by the new recordkeeping requirements-in other words, there will be some economies
of scale given current oversight. In most large metropolitan areas, the
police are already required to gather information for each stop-andfrisk. Each time a police officer searches a suspect, the officer is
already required to fill out a form."' As a result, the information
gathering and dissemination associated with a potential compensation
scheme should not increase those costs much. Moreover, there may be
less civil rights litigation as a result of a more routine compensation
scheme-in the same way that workman's compensation schemes
decrease some litigation costs.2 But there is no question that, overall,
the very fact of compensation will increase costs. There is no easy way
out of this dilemma. It has to be that we, as a society, value the benefits
of evenhandedness enough to outweigh those costs and are thereby
willing to invest additional resources into the problem.
C.

Pooling Issues

Another implementation issue concerns how the pools of
individuals will be constructed for purposes of randomization. As the
illustrations above suggest, most of the pooling that we envisage will
be determined by space and time rather than by additional group
traits. In other words, instead of randomizing within a suspect group
trait, we propose randomizing by location and time. As a result, the
pooling issues will be determined by the location of the checkpoint at
the particular subway stop or street intersection and by the time of
day. One reason to do this is that the stigmatizing harm of being
publicly identified as a potential wrongdoer by a law enforcer is often
a distinct conjunction of geography and group trait.

See
See
16 Ann Rev
230 See
228

229

note 210.
LI. Boden, Worker's Compensation in the United States: High Costs, Low Benefits,
Pub Health 189,190-91,206-08 (1995).
note 164 and accompanying text.
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Some Objections

It is important to emphasize a few points before addressing some
recurring objections.
First, using the checkpoint as the Fourth Amendment lodestar
would not mean that the police could not also engage in the more
traditional police practices of stopping and searching a suspect who is
walking out of a bank with a ski mask over his face and a bag full of
money. The constitutionalization of a randomization paradigm would
not make it necessary to stop and search everyone surrounding the
bank. It would not necessitate randomization in more conventional
Warrant Model situations.
If the police have a compelling reason to stop a suspect outside of
a randomized program, then that stop would be treated as if it had a
probability of 1. If the search does not produce anything, then the
individual must be compensated, and perhaps compensated at a
higher rate than for randomization programs that do not reach the
designated level of suspicion because the targeted harm to the profiled
individual searched is greater. Since there is no randomization
program in place here, and no other search results to aggregate, the
individual searched must be compensated if the search is unsuccessful.
Second, there is no doubt that using checkpoints will not, by itself,
cure all the evils of racial profiling. So, for instance, if the police set up
all of their roadblocks on the South Side of Chicago or only in African
American neighborhoods, then the distribution of arrests will
inevitably be skewed along racial and socio-economic lines, very much
like it is under the Whren model.3 Similarly, if the police use as their
randomizing variable one that correlates with race, the police will be
functionally profiling on race.
But there are reasons to believe that these problems would be
minimized under a randomization paradigm-two reasons in
particular. First, the police themselves have an incentive to distribute
searches widely so as to police all neighborhoods in the city, not just
the at-risk neighborhoods. In order for the police administrators to
have an effective police force throughout the city, they will have to set
up randomized search programs in diverse neighborhoods. If they
limit themselves to targeted policing for the lower-crime
neighborhoods, they will necessarily subject themselves to far greater
costs of compensation under our approach, since each wrongful search
will have to be compensated, and perhaps compensated even more if
there is an added price to targeted harms. So in order to ensure police

231

See text accompanying notes 162-64.
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protection across the city, the police administrators will need to
distribute search programs throughout the city. 2
Second, distributing the burden of policing within neighborhoods
likely would put political pressure on the city to distribute the burden
more widely throughout the city. The wider distribution of the costs of
policing, even within a neighborhood, and the resulting political
pressure that the wider distribution triggers, will likely put pressure on
city administrators to distribute more widely the costs of policing.
Even within a socioeconomically depressed neighborhood, traditional
forms of profiling are condoned in large part because they fall on the
most marginalized populations in that neighborhood. By distributing
the costs more widely, there is likely to be greater attention to any
neighborhood-to-neighborhood disparities in the burden of policing.
Let us turn then to some objections.
First, a reader may object that profiling is more efficient than
randomized searching and that there is no reason to search lowprobability suspects at checkpoints. This is a common reaction to our
proposal, and it can be expressed along any of the dimensions of
policing that we discuss-whether it involves searching grannies and
toddlers at the airport or auditing low-income taxpayers on April 16.
This argument from efficiency, however, is misplaced for a number of
reasons.
The first reason is that, as a practical matter, profiling and
statistical discrimination likely increase the overall rates of the
targeted crime under the conservative assumption that the targeted
population is less elastic than the nonprofiled group. There are longterm substitution effects and a ratchet effect on the profiled group
that, in all likelihood, is counterproductive to the law enforcement
goal of fighting crime. In other words, profiling is not likely to be more
efficient. One of us has dedicated a full-length treatment to this point,
232 To be sure, the police today also have an incentive to police the entire city, they do
police all neighborhoods, and, despite that, they target stop-and-frisks disproportionately on
certain groups and in certain neighborhoods. See Matthew Petrocelli, Alex R. Piquero, and
Michael R. Smith, Conflict Theory and Racial Profiling:An EmpiricalAnalysis of Police Traffic
Stop Data, 31 J Crim Just 1, 8 (2003). The problem today is not that the police do not police
higher-income neighborhoods, but that they target their stop-and-frisks on certain identifiable
populations and in certain parts of town. Under our scheme, the practices would be made more
consistent across neighborhoods. It is the consistency in practices that would make all the
difference. The police would have the same incentive to police all neighborhoods, but would now
be required to do so in the same way.
233 Here, too, naturally, the greater diffusion of searches may trigger political resistance in
the more affluent neighborhoods; however, it is hard to imagine that any neighborhood would
want to do without policing. Policing is, after all, a "good" and tends to be viewed as a desirable
public service. Once again, the consistency in police practices is what would serve to distribute
the burdens of policing.
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and we will not rehash it here." The basic point here is that we cannot
be so sure about the efficiency gains of profiling and therefore that we
should not be so willing to trade off the distributional concerns and
the problems of subordination.
The second reason, though, is equally important: we are not
dealing with public policy in this Article, but with constitutional
interpretation. There is no reason to believe, ex ante, that the
constitutional values we hold so dear coincide with the most effective
policing techniques. There is no necessary overlap of the Constitution
on one hand and public policy on the other. Or, to say this another
way, it is possible that the new constitutional paradigm may allow, as a
constitutional matter, some policing practices that we do not embrace
as a policy matter-and vice versa. Efficiency is not the litmus test of
constitutional interpretation? Now, in this particular case, we believe
that suspicion-sufficient, randomized search programs not only would
satisfy the constitutional values of evenhandedness and privacy
protection, but would also be wise public policy. We believe that the
embrace of randomization would not only promote the kind of
evenhandedness that will ultimately reduce bias and the disparate
racial impact of policing, but also improve our policing practices.
However, we would argue for this constitutional change even if it did
have costs in efficiency.
One further point on this matter: one may not believe that the
courts and constitutional interpretation are necessarily the right
devices to use to address the fundamental problem of racial injustice
in police patrolling. Undoubtedly, it would be better to look elsewhere
than Fourth Amendment doctrine. The rate of review is low, and
review comes late, plus the consequences of violations are largely
insured against today, with immunities for police officers and so on. It
is undoubtedly true that the values of the Fourth Amendmentprivacy and evenhandedness -could be better implemented through
administrative measures within police forces that reward (or punish)
officers or supervisors for disparate hit rates along race lines, for
instance. We do not argue, however, that there should be exclusive
reliance on the courts or that the constitutional standard we advocate
is a better way of achieving a less biased society. We are simply dealing
in this Article with the constitutional standard to apply. In other
words, even if one does not think that the courts are the best or even a
good vehicle, one would want the constitutional standard to reflect the
values we hold dear-privacy and evenhandedness. Our central point
234
235

See generally Harcourt, Against Prediction (cited in note 16).
Consider INS v Chadha,462 US 919,944 (1983).
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is that it is rarely related to issues of evenhandedness- and that is
something we seek to redress.
Second, some readers may object that there are really two separate
projects here: one involves abandoning the "individualized suspicion"
standard, the other embracing randomization, and the two are not
necessarily related to each other. Our response is that they are
inextricably linked. The reason is that once you abandon the
"individualized suspicion" standard and adopt a requirement that
searches achieve a designated level of suspicion, it is important to then
introduce the element of evenhandedness. It is important, in effect, to
limit the focus on suspicion so that it does not have devastating
distributional and subordinating consequences. In other words, we
should not seek to simply increase as much as possible the level of
suspicion (which protects only privacy), but should simultaneously, over
a certain level of suspicion, protect the other value of evenhandedness
at the heart of the Fourth Amendment.
Third and finally, some readers may object that the overall result
might be too little policing. Assuming along with Randall Kennedy and
others that policing is a "good," some may argue that requiring
checkpoints in high-income neighborhoods will incentivize the more
politically powerful elites to minimize policing, which would effectively
reduce the amount of policing in high-crime neighborhoods below the
levels required there for safety and protection.m The fear here is not
that the randomized searches would be too oppressive, but rather that
there would not be enough of them. Our answer here is simple: it is
unlikely that a constitutional standard alone will resolve all public
policy questions and achieve a perfect equilibrium of policing in society.
There may in fact be slight deviations from perfection. But we should
not expect the constitutional standard to achieve perfection. It pushes
in the right direction, we believe, and that is far better than the system
that we have in place now. We need to compare what we are proposing
against the reality of today's policing.
E.

Apples to Apples

To be sure, there are some implementation challenges. But again,
that is equally, if not more, true in the case of "individual suspicion"
searches. The challenges there are well illustrated, again, in the
Edmond case. For what that case demonstrates well is that the
constitutionality of a search under the "individualized suspicion"
236 See Randall Kennedy, The State, CriminalLaw, and Racial Discrimination:A Comment,
107 Harv L Rev 1255, 1255 (1994); Carolyn Wolpert, Considering Race and Crime: Distilling
Non-partisanPolicy from Opposing Theories, 36 Am Crim L Rev 265, 285-86 (1999).
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model is likely to turn on the judge's decision whether to evaluate the
search program at the level of the entire roadblock program or at the
level of an individual stop. Judge Posner made this clear in the very
first paragraphs of the opinion: if the court were to adopt a programlevel analysis, Judge Posner suggested, then the court would perform a
cost-benefit analysis and the outcome would most certainly favor law
enforcement.231 Most program-level evaluations of costs and benefits
do. But if the court were to adopt an individual-level assessment
focused on "individualized suspicion," the outcome would likely differ.
Judge Posner wrote:
Whether the seizures effected by Indianapolis's drug roadblocks
are reasonable may depend on whether reasonableness is to be
assessed at the level of the entire program or of the individual
stop. If the former, these roadblocks probably are legal, given the
high "hit" rate and the only modestly intrusive character of the
stops.
In this sense, the distinction between program-level and individuallevel analyses tends to be outcome-determinative under the
"individualized suspicion" approach. The program-level assessment
triggers a cost-benefit analysis that, under Judge Posner's analysis,
favors law enforcement in practically all cases. The major cost in the
case of the Indianapolis roadblocks was the waste of time and invasion
of privacy suffered by each person stopped and questioned. Other costs
included the opportunity cost of using those police officers on more
pressing police business-such as solving or preventing serious crimes
like murder or robbery-the equipment costs associated with setting up
a barricade, and the costs of publicizing and justifying the intervention
(maybe the police department had to issue a press release and conduct
a press hearing, and so on). The benefits of the program included the
detection of drug contraband, the detection of derelict drivers who
either had no registration or no licenses, and the deterrent effect on
illicit drug consumption associated with the publicity surrounding the
program-what Judge Posner referred to as "the deterrence of drug
offenses produced by these hits." ' A program-level cost-benefit
analysis would compare the aggregated costs and benefits. As Judge
Posner suggested, at the program level the equation would likely favor
the roadblocks because of the supposedly large deterrent effects
See Edmond, 183 F3d at 661-62.
Id at 661.
239 Id at 662.
240 See id at 662. Judge Posner held that in conventional criminal-law enforcement settings, an
individual-level assessment is ordinarily appropriate: "[Courts do not usually assess reasonableness
237
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Under our proposed approach, checkpoint searches would be
analyzed on a program-level basis, but the use of a program-level
approach would not necessarily bias the determination in the direction
of rubberstamping all checkpoints. The determination of the
constitutionality of the checkpoint would stand or fall instead on the
rate of success of the police intervention-in other words, on whether
the level of detection satisfied the minimum requirement of reasonable
suspicion set by the Supreme Court as the probability of detection of
crime. Each checkpoint, then, would have to be evaluated, either ex
ante or ex post, based on the level of detection of crime that is achieved
at the checkpoint in relation to the level of detection that society
considers necessary to satisfy Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
Because it is practically impossible to know ahead of time the
exact level of detection that is likely in many situations, a checkpoint
model of policing would need to go hand in hand with a compensation
framework for the set of individuals burdened by an unreasonable
checkpoint search.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has tailored Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence to fit the exception. The cases that best fit the notion of
"individualized suspicion" are those rare cases in which police attempt
to track down clearly identified assailants, where evidence of the
committed crime is plentiful, and where it converges on one individual.
But such cases are truly exceptional. The more typical policing situation
is one in which the relevant officers have no idea who the offenders are
at the program level when they are dealing with searches related to general criminal law
enforcement" -or at least, "ordinarily" so. Id at 662, citing, for example, Whren v United States,
517 US 806. Judge Posner, reviewing prior cases, found several exceptions to the ordinary situation.
Those exceptions included, first, the case where police officers have information that a dangerous
criminal is escaping along a certain route. Here, there is heightened risk that allows for preemption
in favor of program-level review. See Edmond, 183 F3d at 662-63. Second, there is an exception
when law enforcement faces a terrorist threat. Judge Posner offered the following example:
[I]f the Indianapolis police had a credible tip that a car loaded with dynamite and driven by
an unidentified terrorist was en route to downtown Indianapolis, they would not be
violating the Constitution if they blocked all the roads to the downtown area even though
this would amount to stopping thousands of drivers without suspecting any one of them of
criminal activity.
Id at 663. In this case of national emergency, the court should switch to the program-level review.
Judge Posner identified a third exception for regulatory measures such as sobriety checkpoints
or other randomized search programs involving drug testing for law enforcement officers or
railroad engineers, id at 663, and a fourth exception for immigration checkpoints searching for
illegal immigrants or contraband crossing the borders. Id at 664-65. In all these exceptional cases,
Judge Posner declared, courts reviewing police practices should and do properly adopt a
program-level cost-benefit analysis-which, not surprisingly, results in their being found
constitutional. See id at 665-66.
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and rarely know the specific crime that has been committed. The typical
case is about hunches, guesses, and intuitions about crime-cases in
which police attempt to prevent crime as opposed to investigate crime
that has been committed. These cases represent the vast majority of
policing, and the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the Court has
developed simply does not fit this majority of cases. As a result, the
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is not able to ensure the
constitutional values that we hold most dear-limiting discretion,
reducing racial discrimination, and promoting autonomy in interactions
that citizens have with law enforcement agents.
It is time to discard the "individualized suspicion" standard. The
expression is a misleading, conclusory, and substantively contentless
term that has distorted Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It has
become, over time, a substitute for the expression "reasonable
suspicion" to the detriment of constitutional interpretation because it
has distracted courts and other criminal justice actors from focusing on
what is truly important-namely, the level, the amount, the degree of
reliablesuspicion. Thus, instead of helping to guide relevant legal system
actors to determine the quantity of suspicion necessary for government
action in particular cases, the term "individualized suspicion" has
functioned as a legal rubric that masks the actual basis of the judicial
decision. It captures, essentially, the conclusion-namely, that the search
is constitutional-without offering any reasoning.
The central impulse at the heart of this Article is the desire to
cabin police discretion so as to avoid socioeconomic and racial
discrimination and to distribute more evenly the costs of policing
throughout society. The legal concept of "individualized suspicion"
does not advance either of these two goals-and does not have any
other redeeming virtue. It is, in essence, a semantic hat trick that
masks the underlying factors that produce a constitutional conclusion.
The concept of "individualized suspicion" needs to be abandoned, and
we need instead to explore the virtues of randomization that are at
the core of the checkpoint paradigm.

